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THE DOCTRINE OF STATE NECESSITY
IN PAKISTAN
Mark M. Stavskyt
Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the
argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves.
-William Pitt,
Speech in the House of
Commons, November 18, 1783
I
INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, the governments of many emergent
nations have been overthrown through violent revolutions, bloodless
coups d'etat, or other forms of upheaval.' Many of these countries
have been long unstable due to ethnic, religious, political, or eco-
nomic differences.2 In countries with a strong commitment to consti-
tutional government, a coup is particularly traumatic because
acceptance of the revolutionary government effectively invalidates
the constitution. A new regime cannot lawfully exist within a consti-
tutional framework if it came to power in direct contravention of it.
t Associate Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase
College of Law; B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., New
York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the inspiration of Professor
Thomas M. Franck, New York University, and the encouragement of Professor Liaquat
Ali Naz Khan, Washburn University.
1. As one commentator has noted, the military coup d'etat has become the most
common means by which governments are overthrown.
Organized violence is endemic in the society of the emergent states, but of the
various types of violence mentioned in the preceding chapter the coup d'etat is
the most widely prevalent. But it is a phenomenon of the independence era.
Before 1963, with the exception of Egypt (1952) and Sudan (1958), military inter-
ventions in the politics of the emergent states had been confined to the independ-
ent countries of Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Since that date,
however, from its first occurrence in Togo in January 1963, the military coup
d'etat has engulfed practically the whole of the African continent, and its ende-
micity shows no sign of forseeable abatement. No less than nineteen countries
have experienced it, some more than once. Dahomey with its four coups in six
years tops the scale. The tally is distinctly disquieting.
B. NWABUEZE, CONSTrTTONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 219 (1973).
2. See id at 173-74.
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If the new government continues to function, it becomes the funda-
mental governing principle of the country; the constitution continues
to exist in name only.
Nevertheless, the courts in several of these countries have relied
upon the doctrine of necessity in an effort to legitimize the new gov-
ernmental structure under the effectively invalidated constitution. 3
The necessity doctrine provides a justification for otherwise illegal
government actions taken during an emergency.4 These courts argue
that any constitution implicitly recognizes the necessity defense.
Consequently, the courts may legitimize even the most extreme
measures on the ground that they are necessary to save the state.
One of the most recent cases utilizing the necessity defense,
Bhutto v. Chiefof(Army Staff, occurred in Pakistan.5 In that decision,
the Pakistan Supreme Court validated General Zia-ul-Haq's suc-
cessful 1977 coup d'etat against Prime Minister Zulfihar Ali Bhutto's
duly constituted government. This Article will both explain and cri-
tique the Bhutto court's use of this rather limited doctrine to validate
such an acute political transformation. After a brief discussion of
the narrow confines of the necessity defense, its narrow application
in the United States, and the more expansive interpretation of the
doctrine in Third World countries, the Article will focus upon the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This discussion
will include both the history of the Pakistan court's pre-Bhutto
efforts to resolve constitutional crises and an analysis of the Bhutto
decision itself. This Article will illustrate the inappropriateness of
using the doctrine of necessity when evaluating the legitimacy of a
revolutionary government. Not only does its use fail to achieve the
goals of political stability, constitutional governance, and effective
judicial review, its application is counterproductive to the realization
of these goals.
II
THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE
A. GENERAL
State or civil necessity is a common law doctrine which provides
a justification for otherwise illegal government conduct during a
public emergency.6 Courts must severely circumscribe this common
law defense because a loosely-imposed standard of necessity makes
3. See infra notes 56-189 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 158-89 and accompanying text.
6. As early as 1672, a British court held that "the law for necessity dispenses with
things which otherwise are not lawful to be done. . . ." Manby v. Scott, I Lev. 4 (1672).
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it possible to justify substantial violations of constitutional rights and
alterations of the governmental structure.7 This doctrine is inappro-
priate to any judicial consideration of the legitimacy of a coup,
revolution or other acute governmental upheaval.8
Necessity is a doctrine which bridges the sometimes considera-
ble gap between what the law allows the government to do and the
government's actual response to an emergency. It has no relevance
where emergency state action is taken pursuant to specific statutory
or constitutional authorization.9 Rather, it is only relevant where an
injured party can make aprimafacie showing that the government
has violated the law.
Glanville Williams lists a dozen maxims recognizing the doctrine, from sources which
include Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Bacon. Williams, The Defense of Necessity, 6 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBS. 216, 218 (1953).
The doctrine involves more than just the typical considerations which enter into a
judicial determination. "In a manner of speaking the whole law is based upon social
necessity; it is a body of rules devised by the judges and the legislature to provide for
what are felt to be reasonable needs." Id at 217. An emergency is the sine qua non of
the doctrine. The Privy Council has defined emergency as follows:
[Tmhe natural meaning of the word [emergency] is capable of covering a very
wide range of situations and occurrences, including such diverse events as wars,
famines, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the collapse of civil govern-
ment .... A state of emergency is something that does not permit of any exact
definition: it connotes a state of matters calling for drastic action.
Ningkan v. Gov't of Malaysia, 1970 A.C. 379, 390.
7. Courts can easily abuse the doctrine by using it to justify measures which are
unnecessary to cope with the emergency at hand. Even Oliver Cromwell understood this
potential, when he stated before Parliament, "Necessity hath no law. Feigned necessities,
imaginary necessities.. . are the greatest cozenage men can put upon the providence of
God . . . ." Speech to Parliament, September 12, 1654 in 4 CARLYLE, CROMWELL'S
LETTERS AND SPEECHES 74 (1870), quoted in Radin, Martial Law and the State of Seige,
30 CAL. L. REv. 634,640-41 (1942). Milton called necessity "the tyrants plea," PARADISE
LOST, Book 4, line 393, quoted in Williams, supra note 6, at 229, while Selden said
"[there is not anything in the world more abused than this sentence, Saluspopuisuprema
lex esto." TABLE TALK, tit. People quoted in Williams, supra note 6, at 229.
8. See generaly S. A. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 502
(3d ed. 1977).
9. In France, the exercise of emergency power is governed by the Constitution and
is popularly known as &Rat de siege. For an excellent discussion, see Radin, supra note 7.
Other civil law countries, particularly those in Latin America, share this feature with the
French. Kelly & Pelletier, Theories of Emergency Government, 11 S.D.L. REv. 42, 51
(1966). See also C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 66-72 (2d ed. 1943).
In Great Britain, Parliament granted extensive emergency authority to the Executive
during the 20th Century. These measures included the Defense of the Realm Acts
(DORA) during the First World War, and the Emergency Powers (Defense) Act during
the Second World War. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 8, at 504-07; E.C.S. WADE &
A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 716-25 (7th ed. 1966); 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, CON-
STITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 499-510 (3d ed. 1962); Fairman, supra note 9,
at 72-79; Marx, The Emergency Power and Civil Liberties in Canada, 16 MCGILL L.J. 39,
44-47 (1970).
For a discussion of the use and frequent abuse of constitutionally-authorized emer-
gency powers in emerging nations, see B. NWABUEZE, supra note 1, at 173-80.
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Although the doctrine is infrequently invoked, its judicial appli-
cation is enormously significant. It typically pits a seemingly med-
dlesome court squarely against an executive who is deeply
committed to an unlawful course of conduct purportedly to save the
state. If narrowly and carefully applied, the doctrine constitutes an
affirmation of the rule of law. Where the doctrine is so expansively
applied that it provides a revolutionary regime with carte blanche
authority to exercise its will, however, the rule of law is affirmed only
in the most transparent way.10 This latter application of the doctrine
deceptively transforms naked power into legal authority."
Doctrinally, courts should be reluctant to permit deviations
from constitutional norms. Approval must be reluctant because
courts, in reviewing a state necessity claim, must consider the legiti-
macy of readjusting fundamental political, social, and legal values.
This consideration must be made in cases where the challenged state
action affects individual rights as well as in cases involving changes
in the governmental structure.'2
Individual rights, whether grounded in statutes, the common
law, or a written constitution, are the result of complex value judg-
ments and a balancing of countervailing interests. In considering the
propriety of depriving an individual of a right, a court must recog-
nize that the balancing of the individual interests against the inter-
ests of society has already taken place. For a court now to alter this
balance to favor the interests of society is a difficult task. The judici-
ary must unravel the various considerations which entered into the
initial balancing of societal and individual interests. The courts
should only legitimize a deviation from this initial balance if the
societal intere'st threatened by the emergency which prompted the
suspension of the right is substantially more serious than the societal
interest originally compromised in the creation of the individual
right. Only the existence of an extraordinary emergency should per-
10. At first glance, this transparent commitment appears to provide a beleagured
judiciary with the means to retain some control over a regime. Further analysis will
reveal the fallacy of this initial impression.
11. As early as 1637, in R. v. Hampden, Judge Croke insisted that the distinction
between power and legality must be maintained. The case concerned the legality of a tax
levy by the Crown without the approval of Parliament. In response to 'the contention
that because similar cases had occurred in the past such a levy is permissible, Croke
stated that "[W]e are not to argue what hath been done defaclo, for many things have
been done, which were never allowed; but our question is, what hath been done, and may
be, dejure." R. v. Hampden, 3 St. Tr. 825, 1167 (1637).
12. In response to what he perceives as an emergency, an executive might usurp leg-
islative power by enforcing temporary measures involving denial of jury trials to mem-
bers of a particular religion. Such measures would violate both the fundamental
assignment of power and individual rights to jury trial and equal protection of the laws.
If, however, the legislature had authorized these measures, only individual rights would
be affected.
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mit a reconsideration and readjustment of the balancing of these
competing values.' 3
The use of the necessity doctrine to justify usurpation by one
governmental branch of the power of another is far more problemat-
ical. The typical situation involves executive usurpation of legisla-
tive authority. Where an executive seeks to exercise legislative
authority in response to an emergency, the primary issue is not
whether the necessity justifies the measures themselves, but whether
the emergency justifies a short-circuiting of the legislative process
and a change in the existing balance of powers. 14
There are no circumstances, short of the physical inability of the
legislature to convene in a timely manner, which would legitimize
this kind of usurpation. While enforcement of a statutory enactment
or protection of a constitutional right might impede necessary relief
in a given emergency situation, a sitting legislature is not such an
obstacle. A legislature is a functioning entity, fully capable of
responding to any set of circumstances. The contention that legisla-
tures act too slowly in emergency situations is erroneous. First, a
reasoned response is often a better response. Second, the alacrity
with which a legislature acts can vary depending on the situation.
There are no inherent barriers in the legislative system that prevent
expedient action when it is necessary.' 5
13. An example may serve to illustrate this point. Assume that a statute in the state
of Utopia requires police officers to bring all arrested persons "immediately" before a
magistrate in order to set bail. Under such a statute, the necessity defense cannot be used
to justify a lengthy police interrogation of a suspected murderer on grounds that the
interest in securing a conviction is greater than the interest in securing a quick pre-trial
release. Whether, in fact, the police are "correct" about the relative importance of the
police action is irrelevant. The balancing between the societal interest in obtaining a
conviction and the individual interest in bail has already taken place. Since the statute is
by its terms applicable to individuals suspected of any crime, the court may not readjust
the relative weight of these interests.
An emergency not provided for in the statute may, however, justify a violation of the
statute by the police. For example, if the alleged suspect had knowledge of the wherea-
bouts of a diabetic kidnapping victim who was in dire need of insulin, the court might
permit any necessary interrogation. The societal interest at stake in that case is not sim-
ply bringing a criminal to justice, but in saving the life of a particular individual. Even if
the necessity doctrine were available, it would never justify brutality or torture. The
individual right not to be tortured would constitute a right beyond compromise. See
generally People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 737-38, 497 P.2d 1121, 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385,
402 (1972) (emergency exception to warrant requirement recognized; no need for warrant
where pressing emergency to ascertain existence of a possible conspiracy to assassinate
presidential candidates or high government officials); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d
875, 886, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 562 (1974) (emergency exception to Miranda requirements
recognized; necessity to find location of kidnapping victim overrides individual suspect's
interest in fifth amendment protection).
14. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
15. In discussing the importance of the legislature in dealing with insurrections, one
advocate of emergency powers legislation has stated that:
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The actual motivation for the usurpation of legislative authority
is the belief that the legislature will hamper efforts to alleviate an
emergency by either rejecting or restricting the scope of emergency
measures. From both a theoretical and practical standpoint, usurpa-
tion on these grounds is indefensible. Society's allocation of author-
ity to the legislature to enact laws is a fundamental principle of
governance which defines the essential power relations in a state.
When one branch of government compromises this allocation, the
result is, in essence, a new form of government with an entirely
altered political power structure. When an executive exercises legis-
lative authority or when the courts approve such a usurpation of
authority, such conduct can have no legal validity in reference to the
existing political and constitutional system. Neither the executive
nor the judiciary is in the position to determine what another branch
should do in response to an emergency. 16
The practical consequences of legitimizing the legislative usur-
pation can be devastating. The executive branch is the most corrupt-
ible, and unless it is kept in check, the executive may see emergency
situations as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement. By approving,
in principle, the usurpation of the authority of one branch of the
government by another, the court facilitates the usurpation of its
own authority. Once the power balance shifts too heavily in favor of
the executive branch, courts will become increasingly incapable of
ruling against it. Ultimately, for the executive, naked political power
transforms into lawful power to exercise its will.' 7
The" legislature is the best qualified branch of government to make the initial
determination of the legality of riot control measures. While the judiciary must
be the final judge of the constitutionality of the measures employed, its determi-
nation will come after the damage is done. Similarly, while the executive is the
best qualified branch to evaluate the severity of a given situation and the effec-
tiveness of the various measures available, it will base decisions as to legality
more on expediency than on an evaluation of the constitutional implications.
Only the legislature can effectively evaluate both the legal and practical implica-
tions of alternative methods of suppressing disorder. It has the facilities to make
reasonable predictions both as to what will be required by future emergencies,
and the probable outcome of subsequent constitutional evaluation by the judici-
ary.
Comment, Martial Law, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 546, 574 (1969).
16. Even if the executive or the court is objectively correct in its assessment of legisla-
tive incompetence, the usurpation is, nevertheless, legally indefensible. The principle
behind any power allocation is that, overall, it will vindicate itself. By virtue of the fact
that it is the legislature, the decisions within its competence are the only acceptable ones.
17. The principle that no emergency can justify executive usurpation of legislative
authority is well-recognized in British constitutional law. See Williams, supra note 6, at
229. (discussing R. v. Hampden, 3 St. Tr. 825 (1637), an early occasion in which this
principle was articulated.)
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B. THE DOCTRINE UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
L General
The long and extensive American experience with the necessity
defense provides the best example of the defense's operation in a
constitutional system. The Supreme Court has recognized that dur-
ing an emergency the protection of certain individual rights may
lawfully give way to more significant interests. The Court has not
been so generous, however, with emergency measures affecting the
separation of powers. Where the President attempts to legislate
without congressional authorization, the Court has refused to uphold
the action regardless of the claimed necessity.
The Court has long recognized the power of the State and fed-
eral governments to infringe upon civil liberties during an emer-
gency. The emergency can be a war, an insurrection, an economic
depression, or a natural disaster. The authority to infringe is a lim-
ited one; nothing more than what is necessary to alleviate the danger
is tolerable. As early as 1851, the Court in Mitchell v. Harmony'8
insisted that a response to an emergency must be carefully fashioned
so as not to exceed its necessity. 19
2. Judicial Review of Emergency Measures
The Court has approved a wide range of infringements on indi-
vidual rights as necessary to cope with an emergency.2 0 In Moyer v.
Peabody,2' the Court sustained the authority of the Governor of
Colorado to detain a labor leader for two and one-half months, and
held that such detention did not violate the petitioner's right to due
process under the fourteenth amendment.2 2 Moreover, the Court
18. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
19. The Court laid out the circumstances that must be present before a soldier may
confiscate the property of a citizen during a state of martial law.
[T]he danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the
public service, such as wil not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil
authority would be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls
for.. . .Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is emergency that
gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can
be justified.
Id at 134.
20. For an excellent discussion of the measures that are allowable, given an emer-
gency, see Comment, Martial Law, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 546, 555-75 (1969). See also
MacDermott, Law and Order in Times of Emergency, 17 JURIDICAL REv. 1 (1972).
21. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
22. Id at 85-86. Petitioner, president of the Western Federation of Miners, was
arrested on the governor's order after the governor had declared a county that was
undergoing labor strife to be in a state of insurrection. Placing heavy reliance upon the
governor's extensive authority under Colorado law to quell an insurrection or invasion,
the Court held that "[w]hen it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter
involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the
1983]
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deferred entirely to the judgment of the executive with respect to
whether a state of insurrection actually existed and if the actions
taken in response were necessary.23
The Court subsequently rejected this deference to the execu-
tive's judgment in Sterling v. Constantin.24 In Sterling, the Governor
of Texas declared martial law in the oil fields to enforce oil produc-
tion quotas.25 No violence or other emergency had precipitated this
declaration; instead, the Governor's actions came after oil producers
had successfully challenged in court a state statute that limited oil
production. 26 In ruling that the district court properly enjoined the
enforcement of martial law in Texas, the Court rejected the Gover-
nor's contention that his actions as executive "can be taken as con-
clusive proof of its own necessity and must be accepted as in itself
due process of law." 27 Relying upon the Civil War decision Exparte
Milligan, 28 the Court found that such a contention had "no support
in the decisions of this Court." 29 The Court relied upon the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in rejecting the
state's claim to authority, a claim which amounted to an absolute
prerogative during emergencies.30 The Court found such a proposi-
tion to be anathema to our constitutional structure.3'
necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process
for judicial process." Id at 82-85. One commentator has noted that "[m]ilitary control
by state authorities during labor disputes has seldom been administered with an even
hand. Generally the strikers are branded as insurgents, and the open shop is enforced."
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 92-93.
23. "It is admitted, as it must be, that the governor's declaration that a state of insur-
rection existed is conclusive of the fact." 212 U.S. at 83.
24. 287 U.S. 378 (1932). "[Sterling] exploded the myth that declarations of martial
law were conclusive and unreviewable." Weiner, Martial Law Today, 49 MIL. L. REV.
89, 92 (1970). See Fairman, MartialRule in Light of Sterling v. Constantin, 19 CORNELL
L.Q. 20, 23 (1933).
25. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 387.
26. I d at 389.
27. Id at 402.
28. 71 U.S. 1 (1866).
29. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 402.
30. In rejecting the governor's position, the Court stated:
[If the governor's assertion of authority to override the federal courts]. . . could
be deemed to be well taken, it is manifest that the fiat of a state governor, and
not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land;
that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power
would be but impotent phrases. . . upon [the governor's] assertion of necessity.
Id at 397-98.
31. The Court also stated that:
[F]or, if true, republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty
regulated by law. Martial law established on such a basis, destroys every guar-
anty of the Constitution, and effectually renders the military independent of and
superior to the civil power. . . .Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot
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3. War-time Emergency Measures
Even during an undisputed emergency such as a full-scale war,
the Court will inquire into the necessity of extraordinary measures.
In Hirabayashi v. United States,32 in which the Court upheld the
extensive curfew regulations applicable to Japanese-Americans liv-
ing on the West Coast,33 it did so only after independently evaluat-
ing the need for those measures.34 Given the nature of the intrusion,
the existence of war with Japan, and the constitutional responsibili-
ties of the President and Congress for carrying out the war,35 the
Court found the measures taken to be necessary. 36
Korematsu v. United States37 tested the limits of the Court's def-
erence to congressional and executive judgment. The Court upheld,
endure together, the antagonism is irreconcilable; and in the conffict, one or the
other must perish.
Id at 403. The Court reasserted its power of judicial review when it stated, that "[w]hat
are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been over-
stepped in a particular case, are judicial questions." Id at 400-01.
Even after Sterling, governors in various states continued to use their martial law
authority in some of the most arbitrary ways possible. See generaly Comment, 59 Ky.
LJ. 547 (1970); C. FAIRmAN, supra note 9, at 91-92.
32. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
33. The curfew required that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in a "military
area" be inside their residence between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id at 83.
34. The Court stated that:
[O]ur inquiry must be whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances
there was any substantial basis for the conclusion, in which Congress and the
military commander united, that the curfew as applied was a protective measure
necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would substan-
tially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be expected to aid a
threatened enemy invasion.
Id. at 95.
35. The Court concluded:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive the exercise of the war power in
all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide
scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and
extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for
resisting it.
Id at 93.
36. "[T]he danger of espionage and sabotage to our military resources was imminent,
and that curfew order was an appropriate measure to meet it." Id at 104.
Justice Murphy, in concurrence, reminded Congress and the Court that while a certain
amount of deference was being paid to congressional and military judgment concerning
proper pursuit of the war effort, this deference is tempered by a recognition that certain
rights are so significant that no conceivable necessity could suspend them. Even during a
war, Justice Murphy insisted, the Court still determines which of many rights are
alienable.
[T]he broad guaranties of the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitu-
tion protecting essential liberties are [not] suspended by the mere existence of a
state of war. It has been frequently stated and recognized by this Court that the
war power, like the other great substantive powers of government, is subject to
the limitations of the Constitution.
Id at 110 (Murphy, J., concurring).
37. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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as a legitimate exercise of the war powers, the total exclusion of Jap-
anese from the West Coast during the Second World War.38 At least
in theory, the Court affirmed the principle that only necessity could
justify such drastic, extensive, and systematic treatment of an entire
race.
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except
under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modem war-
fare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.39
4. "Open-Courts" Doctrine
Even during the most severe emergencies, the Court has held
that under no circumstances will military tribunals conduct the trials
of citizens. Only where the civil courts are no longer open and func-
tioning, due to an invasion, can military tribunals convene.
The Court first articulated the "open-courts" rule in Expare
Mifigan, 40 a Civil War case involving an Indiana resident who was
sentenced to death by a military tribunal for conspiracy to overthrow
the government. 41 In dismissing the "conviction," the Court consid-
ered it determinative that there were no armed hostilities occurring
in Indiana during Milligan's trial.4 2
The Court reaffirmed this principle of necessity in another
World War II decision, Duncan v. Kahanamoku.43 The Court
reversed the convictions of a civilian tried by a military tribunal
while the territory of Hawaii was under martial law.44 The Gover-
nor declared martial law under authority of the Hawaiian Organic
38. Id. at 219.
39. .d at 220 (emphasis added).
Justice Murphy, in dissent, took issue with the majority over the necessity for these
drastic measures. He regarded the displacement of the Japanese-Americans as a too-
crudely fashioned response to the possible Japanese invasion of the West Coast, and
therefore exceeding the traditional constraints of the doctrine. Although the danger may
have justified the removal of disloyal persons from the West Coast, there was no justifica-
tion for doing so strictly on the basis of race or without hearings. Id at 235.
The Korematsu decision, along with the evacuation and detention order that the Court
upheld, have been subject to considerable criticism. See generally P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT
WAR (1983).
40. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
41. Id at 107.
42. Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be
actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
deposes the civil administration.
.. .Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality
of actual war.
Id at 127.
43. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
44. Id at 316.
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Act.45 The Court found that the term "martial law," as used in the
Act, did not envision the replacement of civil courts with military
tribunals.46
While the Court based its decision on the construction of a stat-
ute, the decision implies that there is a constitutional basis for the
holding.47 Given the rule of construction that courts should inter-
pret statutes so that they are consistent with the constitution, the
Court's language suggests that the "open-courts" doctrine is of con-
stitutional dimension. In addition, the Court's extensive reference to
the historical antecedents of the doctrine48 reflects a strong judicial
45. Congress legislated for the territory of Hawaii by means of the Hawaiian Organic
Act, Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 153 (omitted as obsolete, 48 U.S.C.
§ 532). Section 67 of the Act gave the governor the authority to declare martial law. See
327 U.S. at 307-08.
46. We believe that when Congress passed the Hawaiian Organic Act and
authorized the establishment of "martial law" it had in mind and did not wish to
exceed the boundaries between military and civilian power, in which our people
have always believed, which responsible military and executive officers had
heeded, and which had become part of our political philosophy and institutions
prior to the time Congress passed the Organic Act. The phrase "martial law" as
employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the military to act
vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the
defense of the island against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not
intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.
Id at 324.
47. It follows that civilians in Hawaii are entitled to the Constitutional guarantee
of a fair trial to the same extent as those who live in any other part of the coun-
try.. . .Extraordinary measures in Hawaii, however necessary, are not support-
able on the mistaken premise that Hawaiian inhabitants are less entitled to
Constitutional protection than others.
Id at 318.
Justice Murphy, in concurrence, had no doubt that the military trial of civilians in
Hawaii was in violation of the Constitution. Id at 324-35.
48. People of many ages and countries have feared and unflinchingly opposed
the kind of subordination of executive, legislative and judicial authorities to
complete military rule which according to the government Congress has author-
ized here. In this country that fear has become part of our cultural and political
institutions. The story of that development is well known and we see no need to
retell it all. But we might mention a few pertinent incidents. As early as the 17th
Century our British ancestors took political action against aggressive military
rule. When James I and Charles I authorized martial law for purposes of speed-
ily punishing all types of crimes committed by civilians the protest led to the
historic Petition of Right which in uncompromising terms objected to this arbi-
trary procedure and prayed that it be stopped and never repeated.
Id at 319-20 (footnotes omitted).
As noted by the Court, the "open-courts" doctrine has some impressive historical and
doctrinal antecedents. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 9-18. "We conclude that to the
[English] publicists of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteen [sic] centuries 'martial law'
meant a regime applicable to soldiers in time of war (i.e., when the courts were closed)."
Id at 18. Although the British court in the case of Wolfe Tone, 27 St. Tr. 613 (1798),
adhered to the open-courts rule, subsequent decisions in the Empire seem to have aban-
doned the rule "where war actually exists or imminently threatened." C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 9, at 156. See 0. HooD PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 502-04. "If it is held that a
state of war does or did exist, then the military tribunal-not being a Court but merely a
body of military officers to advise the military commander-would not be bound by the
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aversion to justice by tribunal. The elimination of open courts, like
the elimination of legislative bodies, would jeopardize the country
far more than any external threat.49
5. Executive Usurpation of Legislative Power
The aforementioned decisions have defined the limits of the
necessity doctrine as a justification for the infringement of individual
rights and liberties. The Court has tolerated certain reasonable
measures in this area in response to emergency situations. Yet, when
such emergency measures affect the separation of powers, the Court
has refused to validate such actions.
Where the President tenders the necessity doctrine as justifica-
tion for an unquestionable usurpation of congressional authority, the
Court has refused to uphold such a course of action. For example, in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 50 the Court condemned
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills during a bitter labor
dispute. In ruling against the President, the Court ignored his con-
tention that the grave threat to the Korean War effort created by the
threatened steelworker's strike justified his conduct.51 The Court
refused to consider whether the seizure was necessary to save the
lives of American servicemen and to permit the country to honor its
United Nations obligations. The power which the President sought
to exercise was solely within the realm of the lawmaking authority of
Congress. The Court noted that in 1947, during debates on the Taft-
Hartley Act, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that
would have authorized such a seizure in cases of emergency.52
ordinary law or procedure." Id at 503-04. Nevertheless, the courts do retain authority
to determine the threshold issues of whether a state of war exists, id at 503, and whether
"the necessity for martial rule" is made out. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
49. Martial rule in Hawaii has been criticized extensively as unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Marx, supra note 9, at 50; Wiener, supra note 24, at 94-99; Frank, Ex Parte Milligan v.
The Five Companies; Martial Law in Hawaii, 44 COLUM. L. Rav. 639 (1944).
The Supreme Court's affirmation of the "open-courts" rule is of enormous significance
to the necessity doctrine. It is an assertion of judicial authority; the court did, and pre-
sumably will continue to, invalidate any actions taken by a military tribunal against a
civilian outside the theatre of war. Thus the rule strengthens the doctrine of necessity.
Moreover, it reflects a distrust of emergency authority, particularly where it exercises its
power to punish. While the executive and legislature may respond most effectively-to a
dire emergency, only courts can do justice. If the civil courts can function, there is no
reason, save the arrogant hunger for power, for not permitting them to operate.
Finally, only civil courts can continually review the legality of emergency regulations
and enforcement measures. The necessity for this form of review reflects the Court's
recognition of the corrupting powers of unbridled authority. Thus, not only does the
"open-courts" rule protect the individual from arbitrary justice, it protects the courts
from having their power usurped.
50. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. Id at 582.
52. Id at 586.
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The justices writing for the majority were not oblivious to the
possibility that the Court's denial to the President of this form of
emergency power might have serious if not devastating conse-
quences.5 3 This risk, however, is inherent in a system of separation
of powers. Justice Douglas argued that, in the long run, this risk is
the price we must be willing to pay in order to preserve the far
greater interest in liberty.54
Justice Jackson, in concurrence, took the opportunity to dismiss
generally any claim the government might advance to broaden
emergency powers; the potential for abuse of authority which would
arise inevitably from the exercise of these powers would be too great.
He drew support for his argument from the notable absence in the
Constitution of any such powers.55
53. As Justice Douglas noted:
Legislative power, by contrast [to executive power], is slower to exercise. There
might be delay while the ponderous machinery of committees, hearings, and
debates is put into motion. That takes time; and while the Congress slowly
moves into action, the emergency may take its toll in wages, consumer goods,
war production, the standard of living of the people, and perhaps even lives.
Id at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. We pay a price for our system of checks and balances, for the distribution of
power among the three branches of government. It is a price that today may
seem exhorbitant to many. Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to
effect a wage increase and to keep the steel furnances in production. Yet
tomorrow another President might use the same power to prevent a wage
increase, to curb trade-unionists, to regiment labor as oppressively as industry
thinks it has been regimented by this seizure.
Id at 633-34 (Douglas, J., concurring). Congress has a function to perform at all times;
it, and not the President, determines the extent of executive discretion in times of
emergency.
The utmost that the Korean conffict may imply is that it may have been desirable
to have given the President further authority, a freer hand in these matters.
Absence of authority in the President to deal with a crisis does not imply want of
power in the government. Conversely the fact that power exists in the Govern-
ment does not vest it in the President. The need for new legislation does not
enact it. Nor does it repeal or amend existing law.
Id at 603-04 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This strong judicial aversion to executive usurpation of legislative authority during a
national emergency was also expressed in the Milligan decision. Although the Court was
divided over whether a civilian could ever be tried by a military tribunal when civil
courts are functioning, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text, the justices unani-
mously agreed that-putting aside the issue of their legality--such military tribunals can
only be established by Congress and not the President. Writing for the Court, Justice
Field stated that "[the tribunals] cannot justify on the mandate of the President because
he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty which is to execute, not to
make, the laws. . . ... 71 U.S. at 121. See Chief Justice Chase's concurrence, 71 U.S. at
139-41.
55. Justice Jackson stated:
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessi-
tate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise,
although it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies
were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how
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6. Summary
American history has demonstrated that executives confronted
with what they perceive as an emergency are all too willing to curtail
individual rights and short-circuit the legislative process. Their
motives are often less than admirable. Regardless of motives, how-
ever, such extraordinary measures demand, as a precondition,
extraordinary circumstances. In a constitutional structure, the will
of the executive cannot constitute a sufficient legal basis for abrogat-
ing the requirements of the constitution. If caprice were enough,
then the constitution would be meaningless. Hence, the doctrine of
necessity must be severely restricted.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld drastic measures cur-
tailing individual rights during a national emergency-including
confinement without trial on the basis of race-it has also prohibited
military trials of civilians in any but the most extraordinary circum-
stances. Moreover, the Court has maintained that regardless of the
threatened danger, the President cannot exercise the congressional
prerogative. No emergency can justify abridgement of the funda-
mental rules of governance contained in the Constitution.
they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they sus-
pected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.
Id at 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Even assuming the appropriateness of emergency powers, Justice Jackson believed
that they should never be authorized without at least some legislative control. The expe-
rience of post-Weimar Germany, where the President had sole discretion over the exer-
cise of emergency powers, provided Justice Jackson with a telling example of the
inherent failings of such a process. Under the authority of the German constitution,
President Von Hindenburg, persuaded by Hitler, suspended all individual rights. In con-
trast, the French and British governments, which also operated under emergency powers
during World War II, were far less oppressive. Justice Jackson attributes this difference
to the legislative control in both England and France over emergency powers.
This contemporary foreign experience may be inconclusive as to the wisdom of
lodging emergency powers somewhere in a modem government. But it suggests
that emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their con-
trol is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. That is the
safeguard that would be nullified by our adoption of the "inherent powers"
formula. Nothing in my experience convinces me that such risks are warranted
by any real necessity, although such powers would, of course, be an executive
convenience.
Id at 651-52. Justice Jackson concluded:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men discovered no technique for
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court
to be last, not first, to give them up.
Id at 655.
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III
THE NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES
The narrow American strictures placed upon the scope of the
necessity defense have been largely disregarded by Third World
countries confronted with unconstitutional political upheaval.5 6
Necessity has been tendered successfully as a defense to the most
egregious and blatantly illegal governmental conduct. Prior to the
Bhutto decision, courts in Cyprus and Nigeria utilized this defense
to approve the virtual evisceration of their written constitutions. In
Rhodesia, the high court utilized a variation of the necessity defense,
Grotius' doctrine of implied mandate,57 to do equal damage to that
country's constitutional structure.
A. CYPRUS
Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and
56. One might question the relevance, apart from the comparative perspective, of
American constitutional law to an analysis of decisions by the supreme courts of newly-
independent, Third World, Commonwealth countries such as Pakistan or Cyprus. The
relevance is apparent in the significant reliance by third-world judges upon opinions of
the United States Supreme Court. There are several reasons for this curious judicial
phenomenon. First, having emerged from the British Commonwealth, these countries
had no extensively developed constitutional jurisprudence. Second, legal scholars in
these countries view the United States as the oldest and most successful experiment in
constitutional government. One author writes, "The major influence, indeed inspiration,
in the present day practice of judicial review, in the Commonwealth countries, has been
the Supreme Court of the United States." E. McWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REviEW 236 (4th
ed. 1969). For example,
the Supreme Court of India has been prepared to admit legal argument concern-
ing American, Canadian, and Australian federal constitutional jurisprudence as
an aid to the development of its own distinctive constitutional jurisprudence.
And some of the most recently independent and self-governing countries of the
Commonwealth have gone even further. The Law Reports of the in-fated Feder-
ation of Nigeria, for example, reveal systematic citation by counsel in constitu-
tional cases, and actual canvassing in their opinions by the Supreme Court
judges deciding those cases, of constitutional precedents drawn from the United
States, Canada, India, Ceylon, and Northern Ireland.
Id (citations omitted).
In the Rhutto decision, the Pakistan Supreme Court referred to not less than five
United States Supreme Court decisions, including Milligan, Moyer, Sterling, Korematsu,
and Hirabayashi See PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 733-40.
The central issue facing our Supreme Court in state necessity cases is universal to all
countries that presume to be ruled by a constitution--to what extent can society tolerate
emergency measures and still remain true to constitutional governance? This issue is a
very difficult one, with both practical and jurisprudential implications. Mindful that they
must rely upon persuasion rather than force, dedicated jurists must carefully fashion a
doctrinal system which effectively protects, during emergencies, the constitution, the
commonweal and courts. Given that the United States Supreme Court has had almost
two-hundred years of historical and judicial experience to develop such a system, its
opinions can no doubt be instructive.
57. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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Others58 was an early and influential case utilizing the necessity
defense to justify substantial alterations of the fledgling Cypriot
Constitution. In the Ibrahim decision, the Supreme Court of Cyprus
held that the necessity doctrine legitimized extensive revision of
nonamendable provisions of the constitution. One of these revisions
was the creation of the Supreme Court that heard the case.5 9
The Cypriot Constitution was an instrument designed both to
recognize and to reconcile the Greek majority and Turkish minority
on Cyprus. Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece oversaw the drafting
of the constitution before the British granted the country indepen-
dence.60 The constitution was a rigid document that attempted to
insure that both communities would participate fully in the political
decision-making process of the island. The provisions that guaran-
teed this participation were unamendable.61  These provisions
included rigid ethnic requirements for all branches of the govern-
ment, the civil service and the military.62 There were also rigid eth-
nic requirements imposed within the judicial branch.63
58. 1964 Cyprus Law Reports 195.
59. The case itself involved a criminal appeal by the government of a trial court
decision to grant bail to three Turkish Cypriot defendants. In seeking reversal, the gov-
eminent contended that, given the current state of revolt in Cyprus, there was a particu-
larly strong likelihood that these defendants would jump bail by escaping to the Turkish
sector of the island. The defendants did not address the merits, but rather claimed, inter
alia, that the court, created in violation of the Cypriot Constitution, had no jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. Id at 201-04. In its decision, the court found in favor of the govern-
ment and reversed the order setting bail. Id at 216. The issue of bail provided the
setting for a far more important inquiry by the court: Was the government's massive
restructuring of the judicial process, in direct contravention of the constitution, justified
under the necessity doctrine?
60. S. KYRIAKIDES, Cyprus, in V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 7 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1972); P. PoLyvboU, CYPRUS: THE TRAGEDY
AND THE CHALLENGE (1975).
61. Cyprus Const. art. 182(1).
62. They included-a requirement that the President be Greek, that the Vice-President
be Turkish, and that each have a final veto over any legislation concerning foreign
affairs, defense and security. Id at art. 48(f) and 49(f). Moreover, the House of Repre-
sentatives is to be comprised of both Turkish and Greek representatives-35 and 15,
respectively--to be elected by their respective communities. Id at art. 62(c). The pas-
sage of any legislation regarding the electoral law, municipalities, and the imposition of
duties and taxes requires a majority vote from each set of representatives. In effect, then,
each community has a legislative as well as an executive veto over all important laws.
Various governmental agencies are required by the constitution to maintain a constant
ratio of Greek to Turkish participants. In the public service, a seventy-to-thirty ratio
must be maintained, Id at art. 123(1), while in the military, a sixty-to-forty ratio is
required. Id at art. 129(1). Moreover, the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) must con-
tain seven Greek ministers and three Turkish ministers. Id at art. 46.
63. The highest court, the Supreme Constitutional Court, was to be composed of
three members-a Turkish Cypriot, a Greek Cypriot and a non-Cypriot who was to be
President. Id at art. 133(1). There was also a High Court, primarily with appellate
jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. Id at art. 155 and 156. This High Court was
to be composed of two Greek Cypriots, a Turkish Cypriot, and a non-Cypriot judge who
would act as President and have two votes. Id at art. 153(1). The composition of the
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The new constitutional government soon proved incapable of
passing essential legislation.64 President Makarios proposed amend-
ments to the constitution that the Turkish community rejected. 65
After a period of rising tensions and extensive armed confrontations
between the two communities, 66 the Turkish Cypriots stopped par-
ticipating in the government. 67 The House of Representatives,
which was now entirely Greek, passed substantial legislation includ-
ing the creation of a new Supreme Court.68
In the lengthy Ibrahim opinion, the three Greek Cypriot mem-
bers69 of the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the doctrine of
necessity to justify the establishment of their own court. All three
members, in separate opinions, took notice of the emergency circum-
stances existing in Cyprus when the House of Representatives
restructured the judiciary.70 The court held that these conditions
made it imperative that the legislature act to alleviate the problem.
Even though the Cypriot Constitution explicitly prohibited the
House of Representatives from altering the provisions regarding the
lower courts, both civil and criminal, was to be determined by the ethnicity of the parties.
Where the parties were either all Turkish or Greek, they were entitled to judges of the
same background. Id at art. 159(1) and (2). Where the parties included both Turks and
Greeks, the court had to be composed of both kinds of judges. Id at art. 159(3) and (4).
64. S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 60, at 16-17.
65. P. PoLYviou, supra note 60, at 37-38.
66. Id at 40.
67. S. KYRiAKIDES, supra note 60, at 19.
68. Id at 20. The law took jurisdiction from the Supreme Constitutional Court and
High Court and transferred it to the newly created five-member Supreme Court.
69. The law provided that the Supreme Court was to be comprised of the five Cyp-
riot judges presently sitting on the two high courts-tree Greek Cypriots and two Turk-
ish Cypriots. Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus Law Reports, at 228. Apparently, the Turkish
Cypriots did not participate in this opinion. The court, however, found that the partici-
pation of three of its members was sufficient under the new law:
[We hold] that this Court, as at present constituted by three of the five Judges of
the Supreme Court, duly nominated by the full court to exercise the court's
appellate jurisdiction at the material time, has the competence and jurisdiction to
deal with all questions raised in the appeal.
[d at 206.
70. In the first few pages of the opinion, Judge Vassiliades took judicial notice of the
following conditions existing during the summer of 1964:
(a) armed rebellion against the government,
(b) armed clashes between organized groups resisting the authority of the state,
(c) loss of life, damage to property, interruption of communications,
(d) control of certain state territory by insurgents,
(e) presence of United Nations troops,
(f) inability of the state government to establish authority and resume
responsibilities,
(g) duration of above conditions for several months.
Id at 201-02.
Moreover, both courts of appeal ceased entirely to function. In August 1963, the non-
Cypriot President of the Supreme Constitutional Court resigned, and soon after, in June
1964, the non-Cypriot President of the High Court resigned. Replacements were not
forthcoming. Id at 207, 249-50.
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judiciary, 71 the court held that the doctrine of necessity can "be read
into [those] provisions .... *72 The court found full justification for
this constitutional alteration because there was a necessity for a dif-
ferent and functioning judiciary.73
The Cypriot court's decision to rest its holding upon the neces-
sity doctrine had less to do with faithful adherence to a legal doctrine
than with expediency. Given the ethnic composition of the court,
the issue before it, and the current political crisis, the decision to
approve this constitutional deviation was predictable.74 The court's
decision to uphold the constitutionality of the legislative provisions
in question served not only to maintain the court's existence and
authority, but also to remove the restraints upon amending the con-
stitution, and to enable the Greek Cypriot community to function
effectively, without Turkish Cypriot cooperation.
In Ibrahim, the court misapplied the necessity doctrine to the
issues before it. The House of Representatives, in altering the judi-
cial structure of the country, could not legitimately contend that it
was acting out of state necessity. At the very least, the government
must show that the country's legislative body passed the extra-consti-
tutional measures. Since only the Greek members of the legislature
passed the judicial reform bill, the government cannot make even
this threshold claim. A measure passed by a Turkish or Greek
majority acting alone does not constitute legislative action. 75
71. Cyprus Const. art. 182(1).
72. Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus Law Reports, at 214.
73. Id at 248, 265.
74. The rigid ethnic requirements were partially responsible for the government hay-
ig to install neutral, non-Cypriot judges. Since those rigid requirements could not be
altered by constitutional means, a necessity arose for extra-constitutional measures.
Given that the constitution did not manifest the sovereign will of the Cypriot people, a
necessary deviation was perfectly acceptable.
The Cyprus House of Representatives has not ever adopted or ratified the Con-
stitution of Cyprus. Thus, such Constitution, which was conceived, drafted and
came into force whilst circumstances were such as not to render it the unques-
tionable outcome of the free choice of the Cyprus people or of its leadership, was
never ratified by an unfettered expression ofjudgment on behalf of the people of
Cyprus, after it had become independent.
Id at 222 (Triantafyllides, J., concurring).
75. See Cyprus Const. art. 182(1). Such a revision requires more than a simple sepa-
rate majority of all those Greeks and Turks present. This type of change requires sepa-
rate majoritites of two-thirds of the total number of Greeks and Turks, respectively, in
the House. Id at art. 182(3).
Nowhere in any of the three opinions did the court even consider the absence of the
Turkish members of the House of Representatives when the questioned legislation was
adopted. Moreover, none of the judges provided any reasons, apart from the uncoopera-
tiveness of the Turkish Vice-President, for the failure to obtain two new non-Cypriot
judges for the two high courts. A true necessity analysis mandates an inquiry into the
nature of the Vice-President's recalcitrance, including a determination of whether any
reasonable efforts were made to persuade him to participate. No such inquiry was made.
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B. NIGERIA
In Lakanmi v. Attorney-General, 76 the Supreme Court of Nigeria
utilized the necessity defense to retain its constitutional power of
judicial review in the wake of military rule. The ostensible reason
for martial law had been an attempt by some army majors to stage a
coup d'etat. As the rebels were gaining ground, the acting President
and council of ministers (the Prime Minister's whereabouts were
then unknown) turned over the administration of the country to the
General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General
Aguiyi-Ironsi. In his first official act, Aguiyi-Ironsi suspended all
provisions of the Nigerian constitution relating to the presidency,
parliament, and the prime minister, as well as provisions concerning
regional governors, premiers, executive councils and legislatures.
77
At issue in this complicated case was the legality of certain
decrees of the regime purporting to strip the courts of their jurisdic-
tion to review- orders issued by government tribunals, including
those pending before the courts. The new government issued orders
through a Tribunal of Inquiry, and the government forbade any
judicial review of these orders.78
The supreme court found the decrees unconstitutional on two
grounds. First, by precluding the courts from reviewing the legality
of the tribunal's actions, the decrees infringed upon the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution. Second, by specifically nam-
ing the individuals against whom the original orders were issued, the
decrees constituted impermissible ad hominem laws in violation of
the fundamental principle that only a court and not a legislature can
make a finding of individual guilt.79
In view of the massive restructuring of the Nigerian government
after the military takeover, the court felt compelled to retain the old
constitution as the fundamental and operative document against
which the court would measure any of the regime's decrees. The
court used the doctrine of necessity to reach two seemingly inconsis-
76. 1971 U. OF IFE (NIGERIA) L. REP. 201.
77. Id. at 214.
78. The restrictions on both review of these orders, and the inapplicability of the
constitution were contained in § 2 of Decree No. 45.
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that the validity of any
order, notice or document made or given or purported to be made or given or of
any other thing whatsoever done or purported to be done under the provisions of
any enactment of law. . . shall not be inquired into in any court of law, and
accordingly nothing in the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution of the
Federation [pertaining to individual rights] shall apply in relation to any matter
arising from this Decree or from any enactment or other law repealed as afore-
said.
Id at 206.
79. Id at 222.
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tent results; it validated the new regime while basing its decision on
the constitution.80 Since there was no necessity for limiting the
court's authority, or passing ad hominem decrees, those deviations
were illegal.81
The government had argued that the takeover constituted an
effective revolution, so that the constitution no longer existed as the
nation's fundamental governing instrument. The court, while not
disputing the basic validity of the doctrine of revolutionary legality,
concluded that the takeover was not a revolution, since the lawful
administration handed over authority to govern, and General
Aguiyi-Ironsi himself stated in his initial speech that the new gov-
ernment would suspend only certain provisions of the constitution.8 2
The regime reacted quickly to this decision. Two weeks later,
on May 9, 1970, the government issued a decree nullifying the
court's decision and declaring that the takeover was a revolution.8 3
Apparently, the new regime did not relish the prospect of sharing its
power with the judiciary. The aftermath of the Lakanmi decision
demonstrates the futility of attempting to control an illegal regime by
legitimizing it.
C. RHODESIA
The bloodless 1965 revolution led by Prime Minister Ian Smith,
head of the Rhodesian Front Party, precipitated a constitutional cri-
sis in Rhodesia. Since 1961, Rhodesia had been governed under the
terms of a British constitution which gave the country extensive self-
rule. Although technically a colony, Rhodesia enjoyed essentially
dominion status. Smith's party objected to those provisions of the
constitution which provided well-entrenched rights to the black
majority. At that time, the white minority ruled Rhodesia; the con-
stitution envisaged, and the British insisted, however, that eventually
80. The court stated:
The necessity must arise before a decree is passed ousting any portion of the
Constitution. In effect, the Constitution still remains the law of the country and
all laws are subject to the Constitution excepting so far as by necessity the Con-
stitution is amended by a Decree. This does not mean that the Constitution of
the country ceases to have effect as a superior norm. From the facts of taking
over, as we have pointed out, the Federal Military Government is an interim
government of necessity concerned in the political cauldron of its inception as a
means of dealing effectively with the situation which has arisen, and its main
object lives and property and to maintain law and order.
Id at 217.
81. I1d
82. Id at 214. For a description of the doctrine of revolutionary legality, see infra
note 123.
83. B. NWABuEZE, supra note I, at 207.
STA TE NECESSITY
the black majority would rule.84
On November 11, 1965, while Rhodesia was under a constitu-
tional state of emergency, Prime Minister Smith made the Uniform
Declaration of Independence (known as the UDI) and proclaimed
the establishment of a new constitution. Although the 1965 Consti-
tution was similar to the 1961 Constitution, the new Constitution
omitted provisions for majority rule, and thus insured that white
minority rule would prevail. 85 The Governor General immediately
dismissed Smith and his cabinet; and the British Parliament enacted
the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act of 1965, which removed
all legislative power from the Rhodesian legislature and returned it
to Great Britain.86 The revolutionary government, however, was
effectively in control of the government, including both the civil
service and the military.87
The Rhodesian High Court, Appellate Division, first confronted
the legality of the U.D.I. and the concomitant 1965 Constitution in
the case of Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke.88 This case involved
the allegedly illegal detention of two Rhodesian political activists,
Daniel Madzimbamuto and Leo Baron. The government had law-
fully detained the two, under the terms of the 1961 Constitution,
during the declared state of emergency and just prior to the U.D.I.
When the state of emergency lapsed after three months, the revolu-
tionary Rhodesian Parliament extended the state of emergency,
thereby authorizing the continued detention of Madzimbamuto and
Baron.89 These two detainees argued "that the 1965 Constitution
was invalid, that the present Government was an illegal government,
and in consequence all its acts, . . .were invalid. The detention
orders under which Daniel Madzimbamuto and the second appel-
lant were detained were thus illegal and the applicants were entitled
to [be released]." 90
In the long Madzimbamuto opinions,91 a majority of the Rhode-
sian High Court ruled that Prime Minister Ian Smith's revolutionary
government was the lawful government, but that the 1961 Constitu-
84. Dias, Legal Politics: Norms Behind the Grundnorm, 1968 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 232,
234.
85. Id
86. Id. at 235.
87. Brookfield, The Courts, Kelsen and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TORONTO
L.J. 326, 329 (1969).
88. 1968(2) S.A. 284.
89. Welsh, The Constitutional Case in Southern Rhodesia, 83 LAw Q. Rnv. 64, 66-67
(1967).
90. 1968(2) S.A. at 293.
91. There were two High Court opinions in Madzimbamuto. The first was by the
General Division of the High Court, see Brookfield, supra note 87, at 326 n.3; see gener-
ally Welsh, supra, note 89; the second was by the Appellate Division of that court.
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tion, which the Smith regime purported to replace, was still the fun-
damental norm of Rhodesian society.92 In principle, the court
accepted Kelsen's doctrine of revolutionary legality as a means to
evaluate the legitimacy of a revolutionary regime.93 The court
believed, however, that the Smith government had not yet become
"effective" within the meaning of Kelsen's doctrinal formulation.94
Since Great Britain was then attempting to regain control of the
country and imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia,95 the regime
was not "firmly established. '96 Only when a regime is so established
can it become the dejure government. 97 Therefore, the 1961 Consti-
tution was still the fundamental norm, or Grundnorm, of Rhodesian
society.98
This conclusion left the court in the delicate position of evaluat-
ing the actions of a usurping authority that was in defacto control of
the government. 99 The court resolved this problem by determining
that where an illegal regime is in defacto control of the government,
the courts are bound to uphold some of its actions.100 In advancing
this principle of constitutional adjudication, the court relied heavily
upon Grotius' theory of implied mandate. 10 1 Although the majority
recognized that some measures of a usurper can be given legal effect,
the justices differed in delineating the criteria for determining which
92. 1968(2) S.A. at 331, 351 (Beadle, C.J.).
93. Brookfield, supra note 87, at 330. For an explanation of Kelsen's doctrine of
revolutionary legality, see infra note 123.
94. 1968(2) S.A. at 359-60 (Beadle, C.J.).
95. 1.968(2) S.A. at 322.
96. Id at 320.
97. According to the majority, a revolutionary government becomes fully legitimate
only when it obtains dejure status. The Smith regime had not reached this point, having
only acquired defacto status.
It will be seen that the definition of defacto and dejure governments which I
have adopted contains two parts. The first part requires that a regime should be
"in effective control over the territory" and this requisite is common to both a de
facto and a dejure government. The second part of the definition deals with the
likelihood of the regime continuing in "effective control." If it "seems likely" so
to continue, then it is a defacto government. When, however, it is "firmly estab-
lished," it becomes a dejure government. The difference between the two types
of government is the degree of certainty with which one can predict the likeli-
hood of the regime continuing in "effective control." The difference between the
two types of government may be narrowed down to the difference between
'"eems" likely and "is" likely because a Government which "is" likely to con-
tinue in effective control could be said to be "firmly established." The difference
here then is the difference between "seems" and "is," a difference purely of the
degree of certainty with which the future can be predicted.
Id
98. Id at 331, 351 (Beadle, C.J.). For a definition of Grundnorm, see infra note 123.
99. Id at 336.
100. Id at 336-52.
101. Id at 348. See also infra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
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acts of a usurper are valid. 0 2 Applying the various formulations to
the case before it, both the General and Appellate Divisions of the
High Court upheld the emergency proclamations of the revolution-
ary government. 10 3
The theory of implied mandate varies from the necessity
defense in that it legitimizes illegal governing authority by a usurper
rather than an executive or legislature. Nevertheless, the two theo-
ries are fundamentally similar in that they are grounded upon the
principle that unconstitutional conduct can be justified in the inter-
ests of preserving the state. The only advantage of Grotius' theory is
that it was designed for application in a revolutionary context. The
doctrine of state necessity was not. The theory freely admits that the
successful revolutionary government is, in fact, usurping lawful
authority. Like necessity, however, it equally undermines constitu-
tional rule.
IV
THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE IN PAKISTAN:
BHUTTO v. CHIEF OFARMY STAFF
A. CONSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL AND THE
COURTS BEFORE BHUTTO
The decisions of the high courts of Cyprus, Nigeria, and, to a
lesser extent, Rhodesia, provided the judges in Bhutto with signifi-
102. Id at 351-52, 421-22; see also Brookfield, supra note 87, at 351.
103. 1968 (2) S.A. at 360. Thereupon, the defendants appealed the High Court deci-
sion to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain. 3 All E.R. 561
(1968). In a 4-1 decision, the Council ruled that the Smith regime was unlawful and,
therefore, any of its actions, including enactment of emergency regulations and deten-
tions ordered thereunder, are invalid. 3 All E.R. at 562. Although the Council did not
reject outright the principle of "implied mandate," it found it was inapplicable to the
present circumstances since Parliament was legislating for Rhodesia:
It may be that there is a general principle, depending on implied mandate from
the lawful Sovereign, which recognizes the need to preserve law and order in
territory controlled by a usurper. But it is unnecessary to decide that question
because no such principle could override the legal right of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom to make such laws as it may think proper for territory under
the sovereignty of Her Majesty in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Par-
liament did pass the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965 and thereby authorize the
Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order in Council of 1965. There is no legal
vacuum in Southern Rhodesia. Apart from the provisions of this legislation and
its effect on subsequent "enactments" the whole of the existing law remains in
force.
3 All E.R. at 577.
The Appellate Division of the High Court, in a subsequent decision, A v. Ndhlovu,
1968(4) S.A. 515, held that the decision of the Privy Council was not binding upon them.
The court concluded that since the Madzimbamuto decision was rendered, the revolu-
tionary regime had become entrenched to the point where it was now the dejure govern-
ment. 1968 (4) S.A. at 537. Therefore, the 1965 Constitution is the only valid
constitution for Rhodesia.
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cant precendential authority to justify an expansive application of
the necessity doctrine. More importantly, the Bhutto court could
draw also upon Pakistan's own turbulent constitutional history to
develop the proper judicial response to an illegal regime. On three
separate ocassions, the Pakistani high court considered the legality of
an unconstitutional regime. Each time the court chose a different
legal principle to validate the regime or its actions. Only in its earli-
est decision, known as the Governor-General's Case, did the court
rely solely on the necessity doctrine. In the two other decisions, State
v. Dosso and Asma Jillani v. Government of the Punjab, the court
relied upon the theories of Kelsen and Grotius, respectively, to
resolve the enormously troubling issues before it.
L The Governor-General's Case
In the 1955 decision, Reference by His Excellency the Governor
General (under section 213 of the Government of India Act, 1935), 104
the Federal High Court held that under the doctrine of state neces-
sity, the Governor-General of Pakistan could act in a legislative
capacity even though he had no authority to do so under the provi-
sions of the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Inde-
pendence Act of 1947.105 The court held that because the
Constituent Assembly had been lawfully dissolved by the Governor-
General, 10 6 and much of its previous legislation had already been
104. PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) 435. [hereinafter cited and referred to as the Governor.
General's Case]. Section 213 of the Government of India Act gave the court authority to
issue advisory opinions.
105. At the time the Governor-General'r Case had been decided, Pakistan still had not
adopted its own constitution. The responsibility for adopting Pakistan's first constitution
rested upon Pakistan's Constituent Assembly, under the provisions of the Indian Inde-
pendence Act of 1947. This act was the British instrument which gave both India and
Pakistan their independent and separate status. It also provided that until the Constitu-
ent Assembly provided otherwise, the Assembly would also act as the law-making (as
opposed to constitution-making) body for the country. Meanwhile, until the constitution
was formally adopted, Pakistan was to be governed, under the provisions of the earlier
Government of India Act of 1935, by the constitution which was imposed upon India by
the British Parliament when Pakistan was still part of that colony. A. GLEDHILL, PAKI-
STAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 64 (1957).
106. The Governor-General had dissolved the Constituent Assembly the year before,
on October 24, 1954, seven years after it first began meeting. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note
56, at 142. Several events precipitated the Governor-General's actions. Foremost, Paki-
stan was still without its own constitution.
For most of the seven years during which it actively met, it [the Constituent
Assembly] was deadlocked by disagreement over what should be the key con-
cepts of the new society and what expression, if any, the constitution should give
to them. The deadlock essentially involved a conflict between Western secular-
ism and Muslim fundamentalism-between those who would give Pakistan a
liberal democratic constitution along Western secular lines and those who would
maintain, instead, an essentially Islamic, theocratic organization for the govern-
ment of the new state. The incorporation of the basic moral principles of Islam
into the constitution in the form in which this incorporation was then projected,
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deemed invalid, 10 7 the Governor-General enjoyed the authority to
involved, amongst other things, the proscribing of legislation repugnant to the
Quran and the Sunnah, with a related problem whether the Supreme Court
alone or a committee learned in Islamic law should decide such repugnancy.
Id at 140-41. Moreover, just prior to dissolution, during 1953, Pakistan was in the midst
of an acute economic, political, and religious crisis. Along with serious food shortages
throughout the country, Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves had fallen to a low level
due to a shrinkage in the world demand for its two principal imports, jute and cotton.
PAKISTAN: FROM 1947 TO THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH 25 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as PAKISTAN HISTORY].
On the religious front, there was severe rioting by orthodox Muslims in the major cities
of Karachi and Lahore, after the government refused their demand to declare an unor-
thodox Muslim group, the Ahmadiya sect, a non-Moslem minority and dismiss its mem-
bers from government posts. During this turmoil, the Governor-General dismissed the
cabinet and formed a new one. Id at 25-26.
The direct cause of the dissolution was, however, political in nature. In late 1954, the
Assembly adopted several amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935, which
stripped the Governor-General of substantially all of his powers.
The Govenor-General was required to appoint as Prime Minister a member of
the federal legislature who enjoyed the confidence of its majority, and to appoint
the other ministers from the federal legislature on the prime minister's advice.
The Governor-General was obliged to act on the advice of his ministers, who
would vacate office on a vote of non-confidence in the federal legislature; only
the Prime Minister could dismiss the other ministers.
A. GLEDHILL, supra note 105, at 73. In this way, the Governor-General could no longer
dismiss the Cabinet as he had done the year before. As Gledhill puts it, the Assembly
placed the Governor in an "intolerable situation," since
there was no provision in the interim constitution [i.e., the amendments to the
1935 Act] for the dissolution of the federal legislature, and so no means whereby
the Governor-General, when at issue with the Assembly, could appeal to the
electorate. Had he accepted the position, he would have been indefinitely sub-
servient to the will of a perpetual legislature, which was losing the confidence of
the people.
Id at 73. Therefore,
[O]n October 24, 1954, the Governor-General issued a proclamation of emer-
gency declaring that the constitutional machinery had broken down, and that the
Assembly could no longer function. A new Assembly would be elected, and the
ministry would be reconstituted.
Id
In the Governor-General's Case, the Federal High Court recognized the Governor-
General's right to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. This right was derived, according
to the court, from section 5 of the Indian Independence Act, which states: "5. For each
of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His
Majesty and shall represent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the
Dominion." This inherent authority to dissolve the Constituent Assembly was properly
exercised by the Governor-General for the following reasons:
a) After 7 years the Assembly had still not drafted a Constitution.
b) The Assembly had become unrepresentative of the People of Pakistan and ceased
to be responsible to them.
c) The Assembly had for all practical purposes assumed the form of a perpetual
legislature.
Governor General's Case, PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) at 486-88.
107. The effective invalidation of much of the Constituent Assembly's enactments was
an unanticipated by-product of the suit filed by the President of the Assembly after the
dissolution. In his petition to the Federal High Court, the President sought both a writ of
mandamus restraining the federal government from acting upon the proclamation and a
writ of quo warranto to declare illegal the appointment of some new ministers. A.
GLEDHILL, supra note 105, at 73. The Federal High Court denied this relief on jurisdic-
366 CORAELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURAAL [Vol. 16:341
enact any measures necessary for the proper functioning of the
tional grounds. Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.)
240. The court held that the courts had no authority to issue such writs since the act
purporting to give them such jurisdiction was invalid because it was not assented to by
the Governor-General as provided by section 6(3) of the Indian Independence Act.
Under the express provisions of that act, "The Governor-General of each of the new
Dominions shall have full power to assent in His Majesty's name to any law of the Legis-
lature of that Dominion." A. GLEDHILL, supra note 105, at 74. It was the practice in
Pakistan, after achieving independence, for the Governor-General to pass only on legis-
lation which the Assembly enacted while acting in its capacity as a federal legislature.
When the Assembly was making constitutional law, i.e., amending the Government of
India Act of 1935, it was assumed that it was acting as a sovereign body subject to no
control. The Federal High Court ruled otherwise. Id The effect of the Tamizuddin
decision was that all legislation which had not been assented to by the Governor-Gen-
eral, i.e., all constitutional enactments, was invalid. Over forty items of legislation were
involved, some of them central to the effective running of the Pakistani government. The
decision, therefore, had the following implications:
(I) All actions taken under orders made after 31 March 1948, under section 9
of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, as amended by the Indian Independence
(Amendment) Act, 1948, were invalid. In particular, section 92A of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935, and hundreds of Acts made by the Governors of East
Bengal, the Punjab (which in law should be called 'West Punjab'), and Sind were
not and never had been part of the law. Further, the criminal law and procedure
of Pakistan had never been applied to those parts of Baluchistan which had not
been part of British India.
(2) The executive and judicial government of Karachi had apparently no
legal foundation.
(3) All laws passed after 1950 by the Constituent Assembly functioning as
Federal Legislature under sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Independence Act,
1947, were probably invalid because the Assembly had purported to change its
composition by laws which had not received the Governor-General's assent.
(4) All laws passed by the Provincial Legislatures since the last general elec-
tions were presumably invalid because the Assembly had purported to amend
the fifth and sixth schedules to the Government of India Act, 1935, under which
the provincial Assemblies were elected and constituted.
(5) All laws passed by the Provincial Legislature of East Bengal after 14
March 1953, were invalid because the Provincial Assembly had no legal exist-
ence after that day.
(6) Other branches of the civil, criminal and revenue law were in large part
invalid because they had been enacted by the Constituent Assembly either under
sub-section (2) of that section in accordance with amendments to the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935, made under sub-section (1) of the section.
Governor General's Case, PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) at 476. The Governor-General
responded to the decision by retroactively validating thirty-five of the constitutional laws
passed by the Assembly. He purported to act upon the basis of section 42 of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935. That section provided:
42. (I) The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promul-
gate ordinances for the peace and good government of Pakistan or any part
thereof, and any ordinance so made shall have the like force of law as an Act
passed by the Federal Legislature, but the power of making ordinances under
this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Federal Legisla-
ture to make laws, and any ordinance made under this section may be controlled
or superseded by any such Act.
I. JENNINGS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN 42 (Reprint 1972).
The federal High Court invalidated this emergency constitutional legislation in Usf
Patel v. The Crown, PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) 387. Under section 42 of the Government of
India Act, 1935, the court noted, the Governor-General's power to promulgate ordi-
nances is only as extensive as the power of the Federal Legislature to make laws. 1d at
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Pakistani Government. This authority, the court made clear, was
only temporary and subject to the approval of the new Constituent
Assembly, which the Governor-General had promised to appoint.
In upholding the Governor-Generars emergency actions, the
court was careful to distinguish the present factual circumstances
from those which led it to invalidate the earlier emergency provi-
sions in the Usif Patel case. 08 It then stated the precise question
394. Since a federal legislature has no authority to make constitutional law-only the
Constituent Assembly acting in its constitution-making capacity is empowered to enact
such measures-the Governor-General is likewise precluded from so legislating, whether
an emergency exists or not.
So that we may now be understood more clearly, let me repeat that the power of
the Legislature of the Dominion for the purpose of making provision as to the
constitution of the Dominion could under... the Indian Independence Act be
exercised only by the Constituent Assembly and that that power could not be
exercised by that Assembly when it functioned as the Federal Legislature within
the limits imposed upon it by the Government of India Act, 1935. It is, there-
fore, not right to claim for the Federal Legislature the power of making provi-
sion as to the constitution of the Dominion ....
Id at 396. Any other interpretation could have potentially disastrous consequences.
If the constitutional position were otherwise, the Governor-General could by an
Ordinance repeal the whole of the Indian Independence Act and the Govern-
ment of India Act and assume to himself all powers of legislation. A more
incongruous position in a democratic constitution is difficult to conceive, particu-
larly when the Legislature itself, which can control the Governor-General's
action, is alleged to have been dissolved.
Id.
The Governor-General responded to the UsjfPatel decision by issuing a new procla-
mation. He again validated the same thirty-five acts, this time based upon his common
law authority to preserve the state. I. JENNrNrs, supra at 53. In relevant part, the procla-
mation stated,
(I) The Governor-General assumes to himself until other provision is made by
the Constituent Convention such powers as are necessary to validate and enforce
laws needed to avoid a possible breakdown in the constitutional and administra-
tive machinery of the country and to preserve the State and maintain the govern-
ment of the country in its existing condition.
(2) For the purposes aforesaid it is hereby declared that the laws mentioned in
the Schedule to the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1955, shall, subject to any
report from the Federal Court of Pakistan, be regarded as having been valid and
enforceable from the dates specified in that Schedule.
Id
The Governor-General next sought an advisory opinion from the High Court to deter-
mine the legality of several of his most recent actions. The Governor-General's Case was
the court's response.
108. See supra note 107. In the Governor-General's Case, as opposed to Patel, the
Governor-General was (a) asserting less authority, (b) providing for a new representative
legislative body, and (c) relying upon necessity and not any statutory authorization.
There is, therefore, this fundamental difference between the situation as
existing at the time of this Court's decision in UsfPatelrs case and the situation
that exists now, that whereas the Ordinance the validity of which was considered
in Usif Patel's case made no reference to a new Constituent Assembly and
claimed for the Governor-General the power not only of permanently validating
invalid constitutional legislations, but also the right of framing a constitution for
Pakistan, the validation by the present Proclamation of Emergency is only tem-
porary and the power has been exercised with a view to preventing the State
from dissolution and the constitutional and administrative machinery from
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before it as follows:
Thus the issue raised refers to the extraordinary powers of the Governor-
General during the emergency period and not to powers which vest in the
Governor-General during normal times when the vital organ of the Constitu-
tion, namely the legislature, is functioning, and the question that we have to
consider is whether there is any provision in the Constitution governing such
a situation or any other legal principle within, outside or above the Constitu-
tion Acts which entitles the Governor-General to act in case of necessity of
such a nature.1°9
The court, in addressing this issue, referred to numerous sources
to support its proposition that the doctrine of state necessity is a
"part of the common law of all civilised States and which every writ-
ten constitution of a civilised people takes for granted." 10 For
example, quoting Oliver Cromwell with approval, the court noted
that "[i]f nothing should be done but what is according to law, the
throat of the nation might be cut while we send for someone to make
the law.""' The court found that the Governor-General's actions
prevented the breakdown of the political and constitutional institu-
tions of Pakistan." 2
In its opinion, the court seemed to draw narrow limits for the
circumstances under which an individual could lawfully usurp legis-
lative authority in direct violation of the constitution. First, the
usurper must be the head of state. The court placed particular
emphasis upon the fact that the Governor-General was the head of
the Pakistani state. The power to act in emergencies is inherent in
his responsibilities. 113 Second, during the emergency, the legislature
must be incapable of legislating. This was certainly true in Pakistan,
since no legislature even existed when the Governor-General issued
his proclamation. The court compared the duties of an executive in
this situation to that of an army commander administering martial
law." 4 Third, an executive can only utilize the necessity to justify
those acts which are immediately necessary to the preservation of the
state." 5 Moreover, since the necessity is based upon the absence of a
legislative body, the Governor-General is bound to call a new Con-
breaking down before the question of validation of these laws has been decided
upon by the new Constituent Assembly.
Governor General's Case, PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) at 478.
109. Id
110. Id
11. Id at 479. But see supra note 7 for contradictory remarks by Cromwell on the
topic of necessity.
112. "[I]f the Governor-General had not validated the laws after assuming to himself
the powers to validate them the constitutional and administrative machinery of the coun-
try would have broken down." Governor General's Case, PLD 1955 F.C. (Pak.) at 477.
113. Id at 486.
114. Id at 484.
115. Id at 486.
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stituent Assembly as soon as it is practicable. 116
Justice Cornelius dissented on the necessity issue, asserting that
the Governor-General's actions went too far beyond his authority
under the existing constitutional framework. 17 Although the justice
recognized that during an emergency state necessity may justify
interference with the rights of citizens, 18 he stated that it cannot jus-
tify "interference with constitutional instruments."'1 9 Cornelius
contended that the sources which the majority cited to uphold execu-
tive exercise of legislative powers were anachronisms which no
longer should be accorded any precedential weight. 120
116. Id.
117. Id at 510-11 (Cornelius, J., dissenting).
118. Cornelius provides the following examples of permissible state interference with
individual rights during an emergency.
The existence of an emergency, say a state of war or a large-scale disturbance,
may justify the executive in making an order commandeering all private motor
vehicles. Similar circumstances may justify entry by officers of the executive
upon privately owned premises which are, in the eye of the ordinary law,
inviolable.
In a more stringent emergency, the services of members of the public may be
requisitioned for the purposes of carrying out works or otherwise offering resist-
ance to check a calamity or offering resistance to an enemy.
Id at 511.
119. Id Cornelius apparently took a restrictive approach toward the necessity doc-
trine; accordingly, it cannot be used to validate usurpation of constitutional authority.
120. Cornelius stated that
These affairs belong to periods when, and to territories where, the power of the
King was, in fact, supreme and undisputed. The records of these affairs are
hardly the kind of scripture which one could reasonably expect to be quoted in a
proceeding which is essentially one in the enforcement and maintenance of rep-
resentative institutions. For they can bring but cold comfort to any protagonist
of the autocratic principle against the now universal rule that the will of the
people is sovereign.
Id at 515-16. Professor McWhinney is extremely critical of the high court's decisions in
Tamizuddin Khan, Usff Patel, and the Governor-Genera's Case. He makes a compelling
argument that the court should have relied upon the "political question" doctrine to
dispose of these cases. In that way, it could have easily avoided the need to adjudicate
the issues presented to it.
Such an approach applied by the Federal High Court at the outset of the consti-
tutional crisis, in Tamizuddin Khan's Case, would have yielded the same end
result but have saved the court from the extraordinary embarrassment (as it sub-
sequently turned out) of its having, according to the particular doctrinal argu-
ment on which it in fact decided that case, necessarily invalidated at the same
time most of the constitutional and administrative structure and machinery on
which any government in Pakistan must rest. It would also have avoided the
necessity for the frenetic legal researches that then ensued in an endeavour to
discover a doctrinal justification for holding the scattered remnants of Pakistan
political and governmental authority together, and the further necessity for the
upholding of the unbridled assertion of prerogative power under the principle
saluspopuli suprema lex that the Federal High Court majority felt themselves
inevitably constrained to in the later special Reference.
E. MCWHrNNBY, supra note 56, at 145. Showing foresight which he could not have then
fully appreciated, McWhinney added that "[t]he rather extravagant sweep of the court's
decision in the special Reference-both the actual holding and more especially the lan-"
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2. State v. Dosso
The Pakistani courts did not have to wait very long before they
again found themselves in the midst of an acute constitutional crisis.
Shortly after the Governor-General's Case, on June 21, 1955, a new
Pakistan Constituent Assembly was elected. In February of the fol-
lowing year, the Assembly adopted the country's first constitution.
Pakistan functioned under the provisions of this constitution until
October 7, 1958, when, amidst intense political bickering in the Cab-
inet and fear of potentially extensive vote fraud, the President issued
an emergency proclamation. In it, he
abrogated the Constitution, dismissed the Central and Provincial Govern-
ments, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, abolished all polit-
ical parties, proclaimed martial law, and appointed General Ayub Khan
[Commander in Chief of the Army] as Chief Martial Law Administrator. 121
Later that same month, the Pakistan Supreme Court, in a case
that was pending at the time of the President's proclamation,122 ruled
that the 1956 Constitution was no longer the governing instrument of
the country and that the will of the President was now the funda-
mental norm (or Grundnorm) by which to measure the validity of
any governmental act.123 Apparently, the doctrine of state necessity
guage of the majority opinion-may well embarrass the courts in Pakistan sorely in the
future." Id at 146.
McWhinney's criticisms notwithstanding, the court, in its several opinions, managed to
accomplish several seemingly worthwhile goals:
(a) it officially eliminated a bickering, uncooperative, and ineffective legisla-
tive body;
(b) it placed doctrinal restrictions upon the Governor-General's emergency
authority; and
(c) it helped to establish a new Constituent Assembly.
121. PAKISTAN HISTORY, supra note 106, at 72.
122. State v. Dosso, PLD 1958 S. Ct. (Pak.) 533.
123. The philosophy of the Austrian positivist Hans Kelsen formed the basis of the
court's assertion that the validity of the new government must be measured by its effec-
tiveness alone. An analytical positivist in the tradition of Englishman John Austin, Kel-
sen insisted that a theory of law must be free from ethics, politics, sociology, and history.
Although he did not deny the value of these considerations, the theory of law must
remain pure. R. DiAs, JURISPRUDENCE 488-89 (4th ed. 1976).
This pure theory views law as a hierarchy of norms. These norms are propositions, in
hypothetical terms, in the form "if X happens, then Y should happen." As opposed to
propositions of science, which describe what, in fact, occurs, these normative proposi-
tions of law describe what ought to occur, i.e., "are concerned with imputation of respon-
sibility." Id at 490.
The hierarchy of norms merely means that the validity of any "ought" proposition
derives from another-more basic-proposition or norm which imparts validity to it.
For example, "[t]he rule that some official should imprison a convicted thief derives its
validity from the judicial order prescribing imprisonment for theft, and this in turn
derives its validity from rules regulating the competence of the court and the rules of
substantive law and procedure." Id at 493. Moreover, in every legal order this hierar-
chy of norms is traceable to a basic or fundamental norm, or Grundnorm as Kelsen calls
it. The validity of all norms rests upon the Grundnorm, whether it is a written constitu-
tion or the will of the dictator. Id at 495. According to this theory, the Grundnorm is not
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was inapposite under these circumstances.
Relying primarily upon the philosophy of Hans Kelsen, the
court found that the two elements for the establishment of a new
Grundnorm were satisfied in this case. First, given the virtual evis-
ceration of Pakistan's fundamental institutions under the proclama-
tion, the President's actions constituted an "abrupt political change
not within the contemplation of the Constitution."1 24 Second, the
court found that the revolution was effective "in the sense that the
persons assuming power under the change can successfully require
the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime." 125
The court then considered the contention of the appellants that
their pre-revolution convictions by Councils of Elders and not a law
court were a violation of the Fundamental Rights Provisions of the
1956 constitution. The court first found that the protections
accorded citizens in Part II of the 1956 Constitution, which includes
the provisions concerning individual rights, were not contained in
any of the regime's enactments. Therefore, the court held that these
the written constitution itself, but the presupposition that the constitution "ought to be
obeyed." A Grundnorm is a basis for the legal order until it loses its effectiveness, i.e.,
individuals no longer adhere to it.
The implication of the theory of the Grundnorn upon the legality of a revolutionary
regime becomes apparent when a revolution successfully ousts the prior government.
Thus, when a revolutionary regime manages to elicit support from society at large, then a
new Grundnormn-that the will of the general or generals ought to be obeyed-becomes
the validating factor for all the laws in society.
Other courts also have adopted the view that a regime which has successfully replaced
the earlier Grundnorm must now be given judicial recognition as the legitimate govern-
ment. See Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, 1966 East Mr. L. Rep. 514, (Uganda); R.
v. Ndhlovu, 1968(4) S.A. 515 (Rhodesia).
One can only speculate about the popularity in Pakistan, and elsewhere, of this theory
of revolutionary legality. Since they had been part of the British Empire, and thus sub-
jected to external and often unpopular rule, these countries may have been more willing
than most to regard revolution as a legitimate political tool. Also, from an intellectual
perspective, Kelsen's theories must have intrigued these largely British-trained jurists
whose jurisprudential background no doubt included such leading positivists as Austin,
Bentham, and H.L.A. Hart. A jurisprudence which severs law from morality would be
favorably received by Commonwealth judges, for whom 'law" had long meant oppres-
sive British rule; the notion that law and morality were necessarily connected would be
anathema from the perspective of the lawfully oppressed. The fact that apologists for the
Empire often asserted moral claims to rule, e.g., "the white man's burden," could only
fortify third-world antipathy toward natural law.
Professor Eekelaar provides other, equally plausible, reasons.
There is a view, professing a pessimistic realism, which would attribute the
results of these cases to personal or political motivation on the part of the judges.
Sympathy with the revolutionaries, unwillingness to relinquish office, even an
altruistic desire to prevent their replacement by lesser men may indeed all have
played a part.
Eekelaar, Princoples of.Revolutionary Legality, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 23
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973).
124. Id at 538.
125. Id. at 539.
372 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAWC JURN4L [Vol. 16:341
provisions were no longer in effect.' 26
3. Asma Jillani v. Gov't of the Punjab
The Pakistan Supreme Court subsequently renounced Kelsen's
doctrine of revolutionary legality in Asma Jillani v. Government of
the Punjab, 127 a case where the Pakistani courts, for the third time in
their short history, passed upon the legitimacy of an unconstitutional
regime. This case involved the regime of General Yahya Khan, who
was Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army until President
Ayub Khan 28 unlawfully transferred all governmental authority to
him in March 1969.129
In this third attempt to develop a judicially sound and politi-
cally practical response to what has become an endemic phenome-
non to emerging nations, the court held that an unconstitutional
regime does not acquire legitimacy merely because it has become
effective. The court recognized, however, that some enactments
which such a regime proclaims, and some actions which it takes, are
valid under a variant of the necessity doctrine labeled
"condonation."130
126. Id at 541.
127. PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) 139.
128. PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 220. President Ayub Khan had himself come to power
under rather inauspicious circumstances. The very day after the Dosso decision, then
General Ayub Khan staged a coup and took over the presidency from President Mirza.
Khan's 11-year reign in office was marked by turbulence and bloodshed.
After single-handedly ruling the country under a virtual military dictatorship, Khan
announced, on March 1, 1962, the formation of a new Pakistani constitution. Although
the constitution contained some fundamental rights, these provisions were more honored
in the breach. A National Assembly was soon convened, and martial law lifted. Presi-
dent Khan was elected during widespread political rioting to a five-year term as Presi-
dent. PAKISTAN HisTORY, supra note 106, at 77-83.
His regime was finally brought down by unified political opposition. In January 1969,
during a period of intense national rioting, leaders of eight opposition parties from both
East and West Pakistan met and demanded the following: (1) full autonomy for East
Pakistan, (2) an end to restrictions upon freedom of the press, and (3) lifting of all emer-
gency regulations, imposed during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. The leaders also
demanded the abolition of the indirect method for electing the President, the National
Assembly, and Provisional Assemblies. Voting for these offices was done by the 80,000
members of the college of "Basic Democrats," who themselves were popularly elected.
This method of election was considered undemocratic since electors could be easily
bribed or intimidated. Id at 97.
President Khan, faced with growing unrest, lifted the state of emergency, announced
that he would not seek re-election, and agreed to both regional autonomy and direct
elections. Rioting continued, however, with many people taking revenge upon the now
powerless Basic Democrats. Many local governments collapsed, and justice was dis-
pensed by unofficial "people's courts." Id at 99. ,
On March 25, 1969, President Ayub Khan resigned the presidency and turned over all
governmental authority to the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Yahya Khan.
129. PLD 1972, S. Ct. (Pak.) at 185.
130. The court stated:
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The court gave several reasons why the use of Kelsen's theory
by the Dosso court was improper. First, the Dosso court was
extremely premature in ruling, only six days after the fact, that
President Mirza's revolutionary government was "effective" for pur-
poses of Kelsen's theory. Subsequent political developments
revealed the shortcomings of such a hasty determination. The Dosso
court appeared foolish, the court suggested inAsma Jillani when the
regime it labeled "effective" one day was overthrown the next.131
Second, in applying Kelsen's theory, the Dosso court failed to recog-
nize what in philosophy is known as the "is-ought" distinction. Kel-
sen's theory is a descriptive theory of law; it is not a normative
principle of adjudication.1 32 Only gross misunderstanding can lead
a court to utilize Kelsen as the basis of a theory that "might makes
right."133
Finally, the court rejected Kelsen's theory outright. Since inter-
national law forms the basis of Kelsen's effectiveness theory of vali-
dation for a revolutionary regime, this theory had no application to
the concerns of a national court. Although other countries, under
rules of international law, recognize that a successful coup d'etat ren-
ders a state or government legitimate, it does not follow that the
courts of that state are necessarily bound to follow that
determination.1 34
Recourse therefore has to be taken to the doctrine of necessity where the
ignoring of it would result in disastrous consequences to the body politic and
upset the social order itself but one has to disagree with the view that this is a
doctrine for validating the illegal acts of usurpers. This doctrine can be invoked
in aid only after the Court has come to the conclusion that the acts of the usurp-
ers were illegal and illegitimate. It is only then that the question arises as to how
many of his acts, legislative or otherwise, should be condoned or maintained,
notwithstanding their illegality in the wider public interest. This principle would
be called a principle of condonation and not legitimization.
Id at 154.
131. I d at 161.
132. As the court described Kelsen's theory:
[Kelsen] was only trying to lay down a pure theory of law as a rule of normative
science consisting of "an aggregate or system of norms." He was propounding a
theory of law as a "mere jurists' proposition about law." He was not attempting
to lay down any legal norm or legal norms which are "the daily concerns of
Judges, legal practitioners or administrators."
Id. at 179.
133. It was, by no means, his purpose to lay down any rule of law to the effect that
every person who was successful in grabbing power could claim to have become
a law creating agency. His purpose was to recognize that such things as revolu-
tions do also happen but even when they are successful they do not acquire any
valid authority to rule or annul the previous "grund-norm" until they have them-
selves become a legal order by habitual obedience by the citizens of the country.
It is not the success of the revolution, therefore, that gives it legal validity but the
effectiveness it acquires by habitual submission to it from the citizens.
Id. at 180-81.
134. In rejecting the theory, the court concluded:
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Without Kelsen, the Asma Jillani court was unable to uphold
the clearly unconstitutional usurpation of power by General Yahya
Khan. Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to rule that certain acts
by an illegal regime must be given legal effect.' 35 As precedent for
this assertion, the court relied upon the notion of implied mandate
first advanced by Hugo Grotius in his classic treatise De Jure Belli ac
Pacis Libri Tres.136 According to Grotius, courts must validate cer-
tain necessary acts of a usurper because the lawful sovereign would
want these acts to be done in the interest of preserving the state. 137
In setting out the limits of this implied mandate, the court relied
upon the criteria established by dissenting Lord Pearce in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke.138 The acts so validated must
[1] be directed to and reasonably required for ordinary orderly running of
the State;...
[2] not impair the rights of citizens under the lawful Constitution; and...
[3] not [be] intended to and do not in fact directly help the usurpation and
do not run contrary to the policy of the lawful Sovereign. 139
Given these criteria, the court was willing to validate certain acts of
Kelsen's attempt to justify the principle of effectiveness from the standpoint of
International Law cannot also be justified, for, it assumes "the primacy of Inter-
national Law over National Law." In doing so he has, to my mind, overlooked
that for the purposes of International Law the legal person is the State and not
the community and that in International Law there is no "legal order" as such.
The recognition of a State under International Law has nothing to do with the
internal sovereignty of the State, and this kind of recognition of a State must not
be confused with the recognition of the Head of a State or Government of a
State.
.1d at 181.
135. Id at 154.
136. See generally H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACis LIBRI TREs (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
137. Now while such a usurper is in possession, the acts of Government which he
performs may have a binding force, arising not from a right possessed by him,
for no such right exists, but from the fact that one to whom the sovereignty actu-
ally belongs, whether people, king, or senate, would prefer that measures
promulgated by him should meanwhile have the force of law, in order to avoid
the utter confusion which would result from the subversion of laws and suppres-
sion of the Courts.
PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 205. Following Grotius, the court poses the following
question:
There is no doubt that a usurper may do things both good and bad, and he may
have during the period of usurpation also made many Regulations or taken
actions which would be valid if emanating from a lawful Government and which
may well have, in the course of time, affected the enforcement of contracts, the
celebration of marriages, the settlement of estates, the transfer of property and
similar subjects. Are all these to be invalidated and the country landed once
again into confusion?
Id
The answer the chief Judge seeks is, of course, no.
138. 3 All ER 561 (1968).
139. PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 206.
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the Yahya Khan regime. 140 The Chief Justice, in applying this vari-
ant of the necessity doctrine, was very careful to state that this prin-
ciple of implied mandate does not, in any way, place a mantle of
legitimacy upon the usurper or anything he does. 14 1 The principle is
one of "condonation and not legitimation."'142
140. The court approved the following acts of the regime:
(1) all transactions which are past and closed, for, no useful purpose can be
served by reopening them,
(2) all acts and legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could
have been made under, the abrogated Constitution or the previous legal order,
(3) all acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people,
(4) all acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State.
PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 206. The court continued:
I would not, however, condone any act intended to entrench the usurper more
firmly in his power or to directly help him to run the country contrary to its
legitimate objectives. I would not also condone anything which seriously
impairs the rights of the citizens except in so far as they may be designed to
advance the social welfare and national solidarity.
Id.
141. With respect to the two challenged enactments, the court found that they both
extended beyond the limits of necessity. At issue was the validity of Presidential Order
No. 3 of 1969 and Martial Law Regulation No. 78. The latter gave martial law adminis-
trators carte blanche authority to regulate the movements of any individuals, by such
means as expulsion, detention, and house arrest, while the former precluded the Pakis-
tani courts from reviewing any actions taken by martial law authorities. PLD 1972 S. Ct.
(Pak.) at 199, 197. The court found that there was no "state of grave disorder" in West
Pakistan justifying the imposition of such repressive measures as those contained in Mar-
tial Law Regulation No. 78. Id at 207. Moreover, to the extent that some preventive
detention was needed, it could have been imposed under the provisions of the less oner-
ous Security of Pakistan Act. Id at 207-08.
With regard to Presidential Order No. 3, the court found that it "too was clearly
unnecessary." "[T]here is nothing to indicate that the Courts were, in any way, sub-
verting the authority of Government or doing anything which could by any stretch of
imagination, be considered to be objectionable." Id at 208.
142. Id at 207. The Asma Jillani decision, bold as it was, had little practical effect
since it was decided four months after President Yahya Khan resigned from office. His
relatively short regime, from March 1969 to December 1971, was marked by both repres-
sion and extreme bloodshed.
Immediately upon assuming office, Yahya Khan issued a proclamation abrogating the
constitution, dissolving the National and Provincial assemblies, and imposing martial
law throughout the country. PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 220. Soon after, he issued a
provisional constitution order
which provided that notwithstanding its abrogation Pakistan should be governed
as nearly as possible in accordance with the 1962 Constitution. The Order sus-
pended the sections of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights, however,
directed that no legal proceedings might be taken for the enforcement of those
rights; and reaffirmed that the courts might not question any order issued or
sentence passed by a military court under the martial law regulations.
PAKISTAN HISTORY, supra note 106, at 99.
In November 1969, Kahn announced planned elections for the National Assembly,
whose function it would be to draft a new constitution. The elections, which provided
universal suffrage for the first time in Pakistan's history, took place in December 1970,
while the country was still under martial law. Id at 104.
The first meeting of the National Assembly, scheduled for March 3, 1971, was post-
poned by the President due to rioting in East Pakistan over the autonomy issue. Id at
108. This political unrest eventually led to civil war and war with India. Pakistan lost
both wars. [d at 111-23. On December 18, 1971, President Yahya Khan resigned amidst
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4. Summary
In a span of less than twenty years, Pakistan's high courts con-
sidered the legitimacy of three unconstitutional regimes. Although
in each case the courts chose a different legal principle on which to
ground its decision, it more or less accommodated each of the
regimes. If only one lesson was to emerge from this historical
nightmare, it would be that accommodation does not seem to pro-
mote constitutional governance, or insure political stability. Indeed,
the very fact that the Pakistani courts shifted constitutional theories
so effortlessly in resolving the most crucial legal issues in any society
could hardly inspire the confidence in the judiciary so necessary to
engender respect for democratic institutions.
Nevertheless, the Bhutto court chose to follow its predecessors
in accommodating General Zia's regime. In selecting the doctrine of
necessity to validate this regime, the Bhutto court chose the least
appropriate of the three legal principles which the earlier Pakistani
decisions provided. Rather than select one of the two available doc-
trines for legitimizing the actions of an outside usurper, the court
chose a doctrine which, until then, had been limited to emergency
measures proclaimed by the lawful executive. One of the limits of
the necessity doctrine drawn by the high court in the Governor-Gen-
eral's Case is that the individual usurping power must be the head of
state. General Zia did not meet this prerequisite.
The court, however, for important reasons, could not legitimize
Zia's regime with either Kelsen's doctrine of revolutionary legality
or Grotius' implied mandate theory. The former was morally offen-
violent demonstrations in West Pakistan against the military regime. Id at 123. Two
days later, All Bhutto, as leader of the Majority Party in the National Assembly, became
President. Id
In its opinion, the court very carefully noted that it was in no way challenging current
President Ali Bhutto's claim to lawful rule of Pakistan.
It remains now for me only to consider another argument advanced by the
learned Attorney-General that the attack is directed really against the present
regime and not against the regime of General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan.
The learned counsel, on the other side, have all protested that this is not so but in
order to leave no room for doubt I wish to make it clear that this decision is
confined to the question in issue before this Court, namely, the validity of the
Presidential Order No. 3 of 1969 and Martial Law Regulation No. 78 of 1971
and has nothing whatsoever to do with the validity of the present regime.
PLD 1972 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 208.
The Jillani opinion was extremely politic, in that the court, by relying upon an implied
mandate theory, had little to lose and everything to gain. From the court's perspective, it
managed to (a) maintain its own power ofjudicial review, condemn an unpopular dicta-
torial regime, and promote constitutionalism and the rule of law, all without fear of
retribution, (b) bury the offensive political theory of revolutionary legality adopted by an
earlier Pakistani court, and (c) uphold necessary enactments and actions of the prior
illegal regime in order to ease the transition to democracy with as little uncertainty and
conflict as possible.
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sive to the court, having already been soundly rejected in Asma Jil-
lani, while the latter would have the court refer to a self-styled
military savior as a usurper. Hence, only the doctrine of state neces-
sity was available, despite its inapplicability to the circumstances of
Zia's coup.
B. GENERAL ZIA'S Coup D'ETAT
General Zia's coup occurred during widespread civil violence
characteristic of the political life of some emerging nations. 143 The
ostensible cause of this military takeover was the widespread civil
violence following the March 1977 national elections. Prime Minis-
ter Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP),
won a stunning victory at the polls. Amidst rumors of election
fraud,14" opposition to the election results developed primarily from
the rival Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a loose association of
nine political parties, and the Pakistan National Federation of Trade
Unions (PNFTU).145
On March 10, 1977, the PNA boycotted the provincial assembly
elections and, the next day, called a nation-wide general strike.
Work-stoppages occurred throughout Pakistan, particularly in large
cities such as Karachi and Hyderbad. Workers engaged the police,
soldiers enforced curfews in some areas, and many arrests and some
deaths occurred.146 On March 14, 1977, the PNA demanded that
Bhutto and his election commission resign and that new elections
take place under the auspices of the military and the judiciary. 147
The widespread violence and bloodshed did not let up. The
PNFTU led more general strikes on April 9, 14, and 19, 1977.148 On
143. See supra note 1.
144. THE EcONOMIST, July 9, 1977 at 79.
145. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, July 1, 1977 at 10.
146. Id.
147. Id Major opposition to Bhutto's regime soon came from the Pakistan Labor Alli-
ance (PLA), a technically illegal body supported by 26 of Pakistan's labor unions and
federations. The PLA was founded as labor's response to the post-election violence.
Their demands, or objectives, included the following:
(1) Prime Minister Bhutto's resignation and fresh elections.
(2) Lifting the State of Emergency and complete freedom of the press.
(3) Disbanding the para-military Federal Security Force.
(4) Establishment of Islamic laws.
(5) Increased industrial development.
(6) Reduction of essential commodities to 1970 prices.
(7) Compensation to those killed in rioting by government.
(8) Implementation of teachings of the Koran and United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights.
(9) Trial of those responsible for killing innocent citizens during rioting.
Id at 11.
148. According to an observer, the April 19 work stoppage in Karachi "was unparal-
leled" for "[n]ot a single vehicle, including bicycles, moved. The transport workers
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April 21, the federal government declared martial law in three of
Pakistan's major cities: Karachi, Hyderbad, and Lahore.149 Under
authority of Article 245 of the Pakistan Constitution, Bhutto pro-
claimed a state of emergency in those cities. 150 The proclamation
suspended fundamental rights under the constitution, expanded the
jurisdiction of military courts to include many criminal offenses, and
made the verdicts of those courts non-appealable. Also, troops were
called in to many other cities by local officials to quell local rioting
and disturbances.15 1
The civil strife continued, even after the introduction of martial
law. The government arrested the top leadership of the PNA as well
as many of its members. 152 Several days later, on April 25, Bhutto
negotiated with the jailed leadership to end the conflict. 53 These
negotiations at first seemed promising, but the talks broke off on July
3, and the two sides seemed hopelessly deadlocked. Each party
accused the other of recalcitrance. 154 Then, on July 5, 1977, the
army arrested Bhutto, most of his cabinet, and several leaders of the
PNA. In his national address on the night of the takeover, General
Zia eschewed any interest in running the government, and promised
to hold elections in October.155
refused to run buses, taxis and rickshaws, or to allow private cars, motor-cycles, bicycles,
donkey carts, or camel carts to use the roads. Karachi was paralyzed." Id at 11.
149. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 6, 1977 at 8.
150. Id Pakistan Const. art. 245 provides: "The Armed Forces shall, under the direc-
tions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat
of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."
151. Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) 657, 694.
152. Id
153. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 6, 1977 at 9.
154. Among their demands, the PNA insisted upon fresh elections, extension of the
power of the Election Commission, and payment of compensation to persons injured
during the rioting. Additionally, Bhutto's opponents insisted that the country's criminal
laws should be changed to reflect Islamic values within six months. The new Islamic
laws would include provisions for extremely harsh punishments for criminals. Bhutto
agreed to make these changes and, confident that the conflict was over, then left for a
tour of Middle East countries.
Upon his return several days later, Bhutto discovered that the subcommittee assigned
to carry out the details of the settlement was deadlocked. However, negotiations soon
resumed. During the final round of these negotiations, the parties agreed to give wider
powers to the election commission, including the ability to order judicial and military
assistance to insure more honest elections, and to punish individuals tampering with free
elections. Many details were also agreed upon, including the times at which the commis-
sion would meet. The government also agreed to hold new elections on October 6 and 8,
1977, and to prosecute those officials suspected by the PNA of election fraud.
Nevertheless, five of the nine members of the PNA council were dissatisfied with the
results of the negotiations. They insisted, inter alia, that certain alleged terrorists be
released and that the election commission be given full control of the administration.
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, July 1, 1977 at 8-11; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEw, July 15, 1977 at 10-12.
155. Id, July 15, 1977, at 10.
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Nevertheless, General Zia, acting as chief martial law adminis-
trator, made widespread and extensive changes in the Pakistani gov-
ernment. He dissolved both the national and provincial legislatures,
stripped provincial governors of all authority, and gave all executive
authority to provincial martial law administrators selected from
among his generals. 156 In addition, General Zia placed severe
restrictions upon the exercise of individual rights and the power of
judicial review. Zia suspended all fundamental rights and stripped
the courts of all authority to review the proclamation or any order
made pursuant thereto.' 57
C. THE BHU7TO DECISION
Despite Zia's purported suspension of judicial review, the Paki-
stan Supreme Court did consider the legitimacy of the new govern-
ment inBhutto v. Chief ofArmy Staff.'58 On November 10, 1977, the
court held, in a unanimous opinion, that the coup d'etat was a lawful
military action and that General Zia was, and is, the properly
installed chief executive of the Pakistani government. Ruling that
the constitution was still in force, the court found that any of the
recent deviations from the constitution, excluding the restrictions on
judicial review, were fully justified under the common law doctrine
of necessity.
Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of the jailed prime minister, ini-
tiated this action with a petition that challenged the detention of her
husband and ten other leaders of the PPP.159 Relying upon the Fun-
damental Rights section of the 1973 Constitution, 60 Mrs. Bhutto
argued that the Laws Order of July 5, 1977161 violated the following
156. The Proclamation, in part, read as follows:
Whereas, I, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, have pro-
claimed Martial Law throughout Pakistan and assumed the office of the Chief
Martial Law Administrator, hereby order and proclaim as follows:--
(A) The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance;
(B) The National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies shall
stand dissolved;
(C) The Prime Minister, the Federal Ministers, Ministers of State, Advisers to
the Prime Minister, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National
Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies, the Chairman and Deputy Chair-
man of the Senate, the Provincial Governors, the Provincial Chief Minis-
ters and the Provincial Ministers shall cease to hold office;
(D) The President of Pakistan shall continue in Office; and
(E) The whole of Pakistan will come under Martial Law.
PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 717-18.
157. Id at 718-19. These restrictions were contained in the Laws (Continuance in
Force) Order, 1977. Id
158. PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) 657.
159. Id at 669.
160. Id at 721.
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights: the right to security of person,1 62 the right to
procedural safeguards upon arrest,163 the right to freedom of associa-
tion,164 and the right to equal protection of the laws.' 65 She con-
tended that the Law Order was unconstitutional to the extent it
suspended these rights.
The government did not initially dispute the merits of the peti-
tion; rather, it asserted that the military order suspending Funda-
mental Rights 6 6 and prohibiting judicial review of any martial law
order or regulation' 67 was conclusive. The Supreme Court, instead
of relying upon the military order to deny Mrs. Bhutto's petition,
considered substantive arguments concerning the legitimacy of the
military administration. The government, faced with the duty ofjus-
tifying its creation and continued existence, first contended that the
present administration was legitimate by virtue of its success and
acceptance. 68
Since the coup d'etat constituted a new legal order, the govern-
ment argued that the court could not measure its actions against the
terms of the 1973 Constitution. 169  Therefore, the government
162. Pakistan Const. art. 9 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty
save in accordance to law."
163. Id at art. 10. Article 10 provides, inter alia, that an arrested person must be
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.
164. Id at art. 17(1) & (2). Article 17 guarantees each citizen the right to unionize,
freely associate and form or join a political party.
165. Id at art. 25(1). Article 25(1) states that "All citizens are equal before law and
are entitled to equal protection of law."
166. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 § 2(3) provides that "[t]he Funda-
mental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution, and all proceedings
pending in any Court, insofar as they are for the enforcement of any of those Rights,
shall stand suspended."
167. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 § 4(1) & (2) provides:
(1) No court, tribunal or other authority shall call or permit to be called in
question the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, or any Order or
Ordinance made in pursuance thereof or any Martial Law Regulation or
Martial Law Order.
(2) No judgment, decree, writ, order or process whatsoever shall be made or
issued by a Court or tribunal against the Chief Martial Law Administrator
or any Martial authority exercising powers or jurisdiction under the author-
ity of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
168. Bhutto, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 671.
169. Relying upon the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, the government argued that
the grundnorm of the old Legal Order, as provided by the 1973 Constitution, has
given way to a new grundnorm provided by the Proclamation and the Laws
(Continuance in Force) Order, and to that extent the jurisdiction of the superior
courts has been altered. The government submitted that as the transition from
the old Legal Order to the new Legal Order had not been brought about by any
means recognised or contemplated by the 1973 Constitution, therefore, it consti-
tuted a meta-legal or extra-constitutional fact, attracting the doctrine of "revolu-
tionary legality." In this context, according to Mr. Brohi, whenever a
constitution and the national Legal Order under it are disrupted by an abrupt
political change not within the contemplation of the constitution, such a change
is called a revolution, which term also includes coup d'etat. In such a situation
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argued, the court should limit its determination to whether the gov-
ernment constituted such a "legal order."170 The government alter-
natively argued that the doctrine of necessity, "a part of the legal
systems of several European countries, including Britain [and] also
the Court has to determine certain facts which may be termed "constitutional
facts," which relate to the existence of the Legal Order within the framework of
which the Court itself exists and functions. It if finds that all the institutions of
State power have, as a matter of fact, accepted the existence of the new Legal
Order, which has thus become effective, then all questions of legality or illegality
are to be determined within the framework of the new Legal Order.
Id See supra note 123.
170. Id It was somewhat paradoxical for Zia's regime to submit to the court's juris-
diction and to assert, at the same time, that a new legal order exists. If the regime truly
constituted a new legal order, then any action taken by the court in contravention of the
proclamation is void ab iniio. Argument of an issue before the court by the regime was
at best, a meaningless gesture; at worst, a concession to the court's continuing exercise of
authority.
The regime, however, did not place itself in this predicament willingly. It was dis-
pleased with the Supreme Court's decision to hear Nusrat Bhutto's petition challenging
the regime's authority to arrest her husband and others. The petition was submitted
directly to the Supreme Court and invoked the court's original jurisdiction under
§ 184(3) of the Pakistani Constitution. Section 184(3) provides that "the Supreme Court
shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforce-
ment of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved,
have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in [Article 199]."
Two days after the Supreme Court ordered a hearing on the petition, General Zia,
apparently displeased, removed Chief Justice Yakut Ali Khan, and replaced him with
the senior member of the court, Sheik Anwarul Haq. Zia gave as his reason the nation's
deep distrust of the higher judiciary. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1977, at A5, col. 5. The
ouster was in direct contravention of § 209 of the constitution, which limited removal
powers to the Supreme Judicial Council, composed of five judges and the President.
Unless Zia was prepared to oust the entire court, however, he had to submit to its
jurisdiction. Ouster of the entire court undoubtedly would have been met with adverse
public opinion, and would have belied Zia's claimed support of democratic processes.
Thus, consistency had to give way to political expediency.
Moreover, there is arguably a principled, albeit limited, role for existing courts even
from the perspective of those claiming that a new legal order exists. Since a new legal
order comes into existence only if it has become effective, i.e., generally accepted, who is
better equipped than the courts in their traditional role of factfinders to make this deter-
mination? This limited view of the role of the court was the essence of the government's
argument. "If [the court] finds that all the institutions of State power have, as a matter of
fact, accepted the existence of the new Legal Order, which has thus become effective then
all questions of legality or illegality are to be determined within the framework of the
new Legal Order." Bhutto, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 671. In this fashion, the court gives
legal content and validity to a political phenomenon, by (1) approving the doctrine of
revolutionary legality, and (2) determining that the new government is a legitimate revo-
lutionary regime. It is easy enough, of course, to label this entire process of legitimiza-
tion as absurd, since validating a regime which denies (or even simply fails to provide)
the court authority to review its legitimacy necessarily renders that validation meaning-
less. Nevertheless, such a validation gives the appearance of reasoned decision-making,
and thus provides a new regime with added legitimacy. If done well, it connotes an
orderly and lawful transfer of authority from the old regime to the new. Indeed, the
Pakistani Supreme Court played this role in State v. Dosso, PLD 1958 S. Ct. (Pak.) 533,
539, where the court recognized the revolutionary legitimacy of President Mirza's martial
law regime. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. The Uganda Supreme
Court similarly ruled in Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, 1966 E. Afr. L. Rep. 514.
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recognized by the Holy Qur'an,"'171 validated the coup d'etat.172
The court, echoing its predecessor in Asma Jillani, rejected the
first argument outright and found contemptible the notion that a
coup d'etat is legitimized solely by virtue of its political success. 173
Instead, the court considered the "total milieu" in which the coup
occurred to determine its legitimacy. 174 Labelling the coup a "con-
stitutional deviation," the court outlined the recent political history
in Pakistan prior to this "deviation."
The court recognized its own limitations in assigning responsi-
bility for the civil strife leading to this "deviation." It was in no
position to determine "the factual correctness or otherwise of the
several allegations and counter allegations made by the parties
against each other."'175 But the court did rely on "the broad trends
and circumstances" which led to the coup in resolving the critical
issues before it. 176 After reviewing these broad trends, the court con-
cluded that Zia's actions were "an extra-constitutional step, but
obviously dictated by the highest considerations of State necessity
and welfare of the people."'177 The court supported this conclusion
by quoting extensively from Zia's speech on the evening of the coup.
The court was particularly impressed by the General's expressed
commitment to democracy and elections.178 Yet the court refused to
consider Mrs. Bhutto's arguments that General Zia's actions were a
direct cause of the final political breakdown prior to the CoUp. 17 9
171. Bhutto, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 674.
172. Id
173. Id at 692.
[B]y making effectiveness of the political change as the sole condition or criterion
of its legality, [Kelsen's theory] excludes from consideration sociological factors
of morality and justice which contribute to the acceptance or effectiveness of the
new Legal Order. It must not be forgotten that the continued validity of the
grundnorm has an ethical background, in so far as an element of morality is built
in it as part of the criterion of its validity.
Id
174. Id at 692-93.
175. Id at 693.
176. Id
177. Id at 703. Among the broad trends of which the court took judicial notice were
the allegations of election fraud, the resultant loss of life and property, the inability of the
civil armed forces to restore order, the failure of martial law, judicial findings of fraud,
the breakdown of talks between the major parties, and disruption of "all normal eco-
nomic, social and educational activities." Id at 702.
178. Id at 704.
179. Mrs. Bhutto contended that the peaceful resolution of the political turmoil was
hampered by General Zia's insistence that the government should not accede to the
PNA's demand that the army withdraw from the province of Baluchistan-to which
Bhutto had earlier agreed-or release certain suspected terrorists. The court responded:
"[I]t is not our function to examine individual incidents or allegations." Id
Moreover, the petitioner also contended that an accord had, in fact, been reached,
though not made formal, just prior to the coup. This the court also effectively ignored.
"It can only be a matter of conjecture at this stage, whether an accord between the Gov-
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Once the court found that the doctrine of state necessity justified
the takeover, it went on to examine the legal consequences of the
coup. The court had to determine what limitations there were upon
the acts of the new government.' 80 Since the court justified the coup
as a necessary deviation from the constitution, it also had to define
the existence and character of the coup in terms of that necessity.
Referring to the well-known Cyprus decision, Attorney-General of
Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim, '8 1 the court specified certain limita-
tions upon the necessity doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, there
must be
(a) An imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances;
(b) No other remedy to apply;
(c) The measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity;
(d) It must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the excep-
tional circumstances. 1
82
The court had already determined that the first requirement had
been met by the new government. The court did not, however, even
attempt to apply the latter considerations to the particular facts of
the case.'8 3 The court only quoted extensively from General Zia's
July 5th speech promising elections in October. 84
eminent and the Pakistan National Alliance would have finally emerged if the army had
not intervened." Id at 705.
180. The court rejected Mrs. Bhutto's argument that since Zia was a usurper, his
regime must be governed by the limitations set out in Asma Jillani, PLD 1977 S. Ct.
(Pak.) at 706. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text. The doctrine pertaining to
usurpers, the court reasoned, only applies where there is no state necessity for the extra-
constitutional assumption of power. Since state necessity justified Zia's military take-
over, his conduct did not constitute usurpation. PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 708. This line
of reasoning seemingly ignored the fact that the Asma Jillani court never considered state
necessity as an option where an outsider took over the government.
Despite the Bhutto court's elaborate, if not persuasive, reasoning, political rather than
legal considerations accounted for its refusal to label Zia a usurper. The court itself
admitted this when it later stated:
in the case of an authority, whose extra-Constitutional assumption of power is
held valid by the Court on the doctrine of necessity, particularly when the
authority concerned is still wielding State power, the concept of condonation will
only have a negative effect and would not offer any solution for the continued
administration of the country in accordance with the requirements of State
necessity and welfare of the people.
Id at 708.
181. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
182. Bhutto, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 710.
183. Instead, the court merely concluded as follows:
It seems to me, therefore, that on facts, of which we have taken judicial notice,
namely, that the imposition of Martial Law was impelled by high considerations
of State necessity and welfare of the people, the extra-constitutional step taken
by the Chief of the Army Staff to overthrow the Government of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto
as well as the Provincial Governments and to dissolve the Federal and the Pro-
vincial Legislatures stands validated in accordance with the doctrine of necessity.
Id at 712.
184. Id at 714-15.
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The court concluded this portion of its opinion by asserting its
power of judicial review under the provisions of the 1973 Constitu-
tion, even though the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order invali-
dated judicial review. 18 5 Since the law of necessity justifies only
necessary deviations from the constitutional structure, the lack of
necessity for limiting judicial review means that the courts still must
retain their constitutional powers.'8 6 Moreover, Muslim law recog-
nizes the doctrine of judicial review.' 87
The court only reached Mrs. Bhutto's contention that the sus-
pension of fundamental rights was illegal in the last pages of its
opinion. Mrs. Bhutto contended that the government could only
abrogate fundamental rights under Article 232 of the constitution. 88
Since Zia had already revoked the emergency proclaimed under the
article, there was no legal basis for the government's continued sus-
pension of these rights. The court, however, ignored the formal rev-
ocation of the state of emergency and found that the martial law
order suspending fundamental rights had the legal effect of a Procla-
mation of Emergency under Article 232. Since the Martial Law
185. The court stated:
[T]he superior Courts continue to have the power of judicial review to judge the
validity of any act or action of the Martial Law Authorities, if challenged, in the
light of the principles underlying the law of necessity as stated above. Their
powers under Article 199 of the Constitution thus remain available to their full
extent, and may be exercised as heretofore, notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary contained in any Martial Law Regulation or Order, Presidential Order or
Ordinance.
Id at 716.
186. Id at 716-17.
187. Id at 717.
188. Pakistan Const. art. 232, states:
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which the security
of Pakistan, or any part thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression, or
by internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial Government to con-
trol, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency.
Pakistan Const. art. 233(1) & (2) provide that:
(I) Nothing contained in Articles 15 [right to peaceful assembly], 17 [right to free
association], 18 [right to enter upon lawful profession], 19 [right to free speech
and press] and 24 [right to property] shall, while a Proclamation of Emergency is
in force, restrict the power of the State as defined in Article 7 to make any law or
to take any executive action which it would, but for the provisions in the said
Articles, be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the
extent of the incompetency cease to have effect, and shall be deemed to have
been repealed, at the time when the Proclamation is revoked or has ceased to be
in force.
(2) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in force, the President may, by Order,
declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the Fun-
damental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II as may be specified in the
Order, and any proceeding in any court which is for the enforcement, or involves
the determination of any question as to the infringement, of any of the Rights so
specified, shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation
is in force, and any such Order may be made in respect of the whole or any part
of Pakistan.
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orders were valid, Mrs. Bhutto's petition failed to overturn the sus-
pension of fundamental rights or gain her husband's release.18 9
D. INVENTION AS THE MOTHER OF NECESSITY
By hearing the Bhutto case, the court acted in direct contraven-
tion of the martial law order. This disobedience to General Zia's
orders, with its possible consequences, demonstrated tremendous
courage by the court. Ignoring the possibility that the regime might
forcefully terminate the hearing and subject its members to sanc-
tions, the court conducted an orderly, ten-week long hearing.
Since the court had several alternatives to hearing the peti-
tion,190 why did it choose to risk its very existence as a court to rule
on this matter? Even more puzzling is that the court's actual result,
that the detention of Bhutto and ten others could continue, would
have been the practical result had the court chosen the safer route of
denying jurisdiction to hear the petition. In fact, the court's holding
was an act far more supportive of the new regime than any of the
189. Bhutto, PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 722.
[T]he provisions contained in clause (3) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in
Force) Order, 1977, suspending the right to enforce Fundamental Rights are
valid for the reason that the situation prevailing in the country was obviously of
such a nature as to amount to an Emergency contemplated by clause (I) of Arti-
cle 232 of the Constitution, and the right to enforce Fundamental Rights could,
therefore, be legitimately suspended by an order of the kind which could have
been made under clause (2) of Article 233 of the Constitution.
A Proclamation of Emergency, however, cannot remain in force forever under the
constitution. Article 232(7) mandates that a proclamation shall expire within two
months, unless it has been approved by a joint sitting of Parliament. Even then, the
proclamation can only be extended six months at a time. If the National Assembly is
dissolved at the time, section 8 provides that the proclamation can extend up to four
months. The court neglected to state whether and how this provision applies to the new
regime.
190. The following options were available to the court:
a. The court could have refused to exercise its original jurisdiction under § 184(3) of
the constitution, and allow the lower courts to resolve the issue as is the ordinary course
of such petitions. In this fashion, the court could have at least postponed any possible
confrontation between it and the regime. Moreover, since Zia claimed that his military
regime was only temporary, the time element might remove the possibility of confronta-
tion between the judicial and military authority of the state. Of course, if the court had
refused to hear the petition on these grounds, it would have placed itself in the absurd
and indefensible position of ruling that Mrs. Bhutto's petition did not contain a "ques-
tion of public importance." Such a position could have severely damaged any credibility
the court might need to win support for its future ruling on the matter.
b. The court could have simply refused to hear the petition on grounds that the Laws
Order denied them the jurisdiction to do so.
c. The court could have found that the regime's actions in arresting its political oppo-
nents comported fully with the Laws Order. Such a finding would have required the
limited exercise of jurisdiction, if only to see that the regime acted in accordance with its
own rules, but Zia probably would have found this to be the least objectionable
approach.
Alternatives (b) and (c) would have been defensible in view of the oath that each judge
had taken, swearing allegiance to the new regime.
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court's other alternatives. An analysis of the Bhutto decision must
explain why the court was willing to risk its existence for the oppor-
tunity to clothe the regime in a mantle of legitimacy.
The only explanation for this paradox is that the court saw no
other way to preserve meaningfully the last remaining vestige of
democratic rule in Pakistan-the court itself and the power of judi-
cial review.1 91 Had the court willingly accepted the regime's limits
upon its powers of judicial review, the judges would appear to be
silent partners to any and all forms of political terror promulgated
by the regime. By exercising judicial review over the most important
legal and political issue facing the new regime-its fundamental
legitimacy-then deciding in the Regime's favor, the court retained
its judicial authority in the most politic fashion available. 192
191. Stated in its simplest terms, judicial review means that a court has the power to
refuse to give effect to legislation when that legislation is inconsistent with the court's
interpretation of the constitution. Many modem states, particularly emerging nations,
have adopted this originally American doctrine as the only effective means to ensure the
protection of fundamental societal values embodied in their constitutions.
Desirous of protecting the permanent will, rather than the temporary whims of
the people, many modem states have reasserted higher law principles through
written constitutions. Thus there has been a synthesis of three separate concepts:
the supremacy of certain higher principles, the need to put even the higher law in
written form, and the employment of the judiciary as a tool for enforcing the
constitution against ordinary legislation.
M. CAPPELLErI, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 41 (1971). Another
author writes,
The popularity and also the widespread practical application of the institution of
judicial review of the constitution, in the constitution-making of post-World War
II Continental Europe and also of the "new," (ex-Colonial) countries, is a tribute
to its public acceptance as a prime instrument of democratic constitutionalism at
the present day.
E. McWHNNEY, supra note 56, at 233. For an excellent argument on the need for judi-
cial review in emerging countries, see B. NWABUEZE, supra note 1, at 14-21.
192. Essentially the court found that (a) the coup was legitimate and (b) the suspen-
sion of fundamental rights was equally legitimate. However, it and not the regime must
make those determinations.
General Zia, confronted with this decision, would be hard-pressed to fault the court.
If he were to take any action against the court for its insistence upon exercising judicial
review, he would certainly appear as a power-hungry usurper bent on destroying every
last vestige of constitutional government. Since the court ruled in his favor on the sub-
stantive issues, he could hardly argue that it was interfering with his efforts to restore
order and, eventually, democracy. After all, the present members of the Supreme Court
had taken oaths of allegiance to the new regime. PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 674. More-
over, any attempt to undermine the court would cause General Zia to lose a valuable
ally.
On the other hand, a ruling against the government on this issue would not only have
brought a nullification of the ruling, but might have prompted the Zia regime to declare
itself, as did the Nigerian military after the Lakanmi decision, see supra notes 76-89 and
accompanying text, a revolutionary government that had replaced the entire pre-existing
legal order. Such an explicit declaration would have surely precluded the court from
ever again grounding a decision upon the 1973 Constitution. In its grab for power, the
court could not risk forcing Zia's hand.
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To maintain judicial review, the court had to assume, to the
extent possible, the continued validity of the 1973 Constitution. This
document provided for both the existence and the authority of the
Supreme Court. If the constitution were in abeyance, as General Zia
contended, the court would have no constitutional underpinnings to
justify its continued legal existence. 93 This would place the court's
authority at the complete discretion of the regime.
This constitutional basis for judicial review was more appropri-
ate for the court than such alternate grounds as natural law 94 or
even Muslim law.195 The people of Pakistan shared a deep commit-
Nevertheless, the short term benefits to the court of allying itself with Zia's regime are
significantly outweighed by the overall damage to Pakistani society through validation of
such blatantly illegal conduct.
193. Without the constitution, the existence and authority of the Supreme Court
would be entirely grounded upon § 2(2) of the Laws Order.
194. There are several historical antecedents upon which to establish a natural law
basis for judicial review. See M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 191, at 36-41. One of the most
famous is Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's case, 77 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (C.P. 1610), in
which he "asserted judicial power to disregard an act of Parliament violating common
right and reason." Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 854 (1978). Grey relies upon the
natural law basis of judicial review to defend the "noninterpretivist" approach toward
constitutional adjudication, i.e., that the "Supreme Court has the obligation to articulate
the changing content of the nation's fundamental values and that it is charged with
evolving and applying the society's fundamental principles." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (10th ed. 1980).
195. Although the court did rely upon Muslim law to bolster its claim to judicial
review, it was clearly not the court's primary basis.
The Courts of Justice are an embodiment and a symbol of the conscience of the
Millat (Muslim community), and provide an effective safeguard for the rights of
the subjects. On this principle as well, the power of judicial review for judging
the validity of the actions of the Martial Law Authorities must continue to
remain in the superior Courts.
PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 717 (emphasis added). Reliance upon religious doctrine in this
manner demonstrates the strong religious content of Pakistani legal and political affairs.
It appeared to be an attempt by the court to cover itself in religious legitimacy, and
thereby appeal to Zia's claimed commitment to fundamental Muslim principles.
The ideology of Pakistan embodying the doctrine that sovereignty belongs to
Allah and is to be exercised on his behalf as a sacred trust by the chosen repre-
sentatives of the people, strongly militates against placing the rule for the time
being above the law, and not accountable to any one in the realm. Muslim rulers
have always regarded themselves as being accountable to the Courts of the land
for all their actions and have never claimed exemption even from personal
appearance in the Court.
Id
The court chose not to rely solely on Muslim law because it could not realistically
abandon the constitution as the expression of fundamental principles in favor of the
Quran and Sunnah. First, the judges were trained in secular law and therefore incapable
of determining when the regime's conduct exceeded the permissible bounds of Muslim
law. Second, Supreme Court judges, by virtue of their Western training and their posi-
tion on the civil courts, reflect the political tradition which had historically rejected Mus-
lim fundamentalism as the predominant norm of Pakistani political life. During
deliberations of the first Constituent Assembly, Muslim religious leaders proposed "that
a Commission of Holy Men learned in the Quran and Sunnah, should have power to
pass on all aws enacted by the legislature and to determine their validity in accordance
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ment to a constitutional form of government . 96 General Zia
addressed this commitment by promising to hold elections and
assuring the country that the constitution was only in abeyance.
By grounding its decision upon necessity, the court reversed
General Zia's governing principle that he would determine how
much of the Pakistani Constitution to retain in his regime. Implicit
in the proclamation was the claim that his decisions and not consti-
tutional doctrine would be the fundamental governing instrument
for Pakistan. The Bhutto court ruled explicitly to the contrary; the
constitution was still in effect, and the government could only abro-
gate it to the extent that necessity demanded. Based upon its consti-
tutionally mandated authority, the court asserted its power to
determine whether sufficient necessity existed for any deviation.
The necessity doctrine is not suitable to a coup d'etat. The oper-
ation of the doctrine presumes a political structure where the rule of
law prevails. Since a coup in a constitutional political structure is a
denial of the rule of law, reliance upon the necessity doctrine is a
sham. The use of the doctrine attaches legal respectability to an
unquestionably illegal regime and gives a new government the
appearance of constitutional propriety. Power and law are at odds
in a coup, but necessity forces them to converge.
The use of the necessity doctrine in such a setting is a judicial
betrayal of constitutional government, reasoned decision-making,
and justice. While the court might hope to serve in an oversight
with their conformity or non-conformity to the Quran and Sunnah." E. MCWHINNEY,
supra note 60, at 150. The fundamentalists lost out, and what emerged in that first con-
stitution was an essentially unenforceable provision that "[n]o law shall be enacted which
is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,
hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be brought into
conformity with such Injunctions." Pak. Const. art. 198(1) quoted in Id at 149. Thus,
McWhinney writes, any possibility that Pakistan would be governed under fundamental
Muslim principles was finally laid to rest.
Lacking any enforcement agency other than the predominantly lay-educated
Supreme Court, these Muslim fundamentalist provisions seemed likely to reduce
to pious injunctions of purely moral significance, for individual members of the
government to interpret according to their consciences. And even here the very
generality of the Quran and Sunnah, and their lack of specificity and concrete-
ness of ruling as to contemporary problems of political life, should have ensured
that they would be no real barrier to secularist ideas of predominantly Western-
trained (especially in law) political leaders.
Id at 150.
Lastly, and precisely because the Supreme Court judges are secular in training and
perspective, any attempt by the court to render a decision based only upon substantive
Muslim law could subject them to severe criticism from the country's holy community.
Religious leaders would argue, and quite justifiably, that they, and not a secular court,
are best able to interpret the Quran. More importantly, if the decision so criticized were
to go against the regime, General Zia would have a pretext to abolish the court entirely.
196. See generally A. GLEDHILL, supra note 105; E. McWHINNEY, supra note 56, at
140-55.
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capacity by allying itself with the regime in this manner, this result is
unlikely. Events in Pakistan subsequent to the decision demonstrate
that a military dictatorship will use the legal process only to the
extent that it helps to consolidate the regime's power. 197
The necessity defense presumes that the state and not an out-
sider undertakes the extra-legal acts. 198 Generally, it is the execu-
tive, the legislature, or both that authorize the military or civilian
authorities to act in derogation of the law. It is the governor's posi-
tion, coupled with the necessity, which permits constitutional devia-
tions. 199 In contrast, General Zia acted upon his own authority, in
derogation of the law of Pakistan, and in violation of the orders of
the civilian government of Prime Minister Bhutto.2°
°
Moreover, Zia's emergency measures went far beyond even
those permitted a lawful head of state. By altering or suspending
key portions of the constitution without Parliamentary approval, his
military regime was improperly usurping legislative power. Worse
yet, he eliminated the legislature outright. It is one thing to enforce
emergency legislation without prior legislative approval and quite
another to eliminate the legislature as one of those emergency meas-
ures. The former compromises the constitution, the latter destroys it.
Zia's measures were far more harmful to the state than the polit-
197. See infra note 203.
198. The necessity doctrine provides a justification for ilegal governmental acts taken
during an emergency. The doctrine would be undermined if it were also applied to ille-
gal acts taken by persons outside the government on the grounds of state necessity.
199. In the Cyprus decision, Attorney-General v. Mustafa Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus L.R.
195, a case relied upon by the Bhutto court, see supra notes 181-184 and accompanying
text, all the precedents which the Cypriot Supreme Court invoked grounded a govern-
ment's right to deviate from the law upon its general responsibility to preserve the state.
"Judicial decisions in various countries have acknowledged that in abnormal conditions
exceptional circumstances impose on those exercising the power of the State the duty to
take exceptional measures for the salvation of the country." Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus L.R.
at 257-58. In particular, the court refers to the Greek law of necessity.
[I]n exceptional circumstances the right must be acknowledged to the Govern-
ment to regulate by legislation certain exceptional matters relating to the accom-
plishment of their mission, that is, the restoration of law and order and public
security, "by deviating from the constitution" . . . "if it is indispensably and
imperatively necessary and inevitable.'
Id at 261 (emphasis added). Professor Nwabueze makes a similar point when he writes,
referring to the actions of the Smith regime in Rhodesia:
While necessity is admittedly available to private persons in private law, it is
difficult to see how it can enable a private individual to claim to exercise the
legislative or executive powers of a state on the ground that that is necessary for
the preservation of society.
B. NWABUEZE, supra note I, at 212. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
200. According to the constitution, the armed forces have no independent role in the
Pakistani government. Pakistan Const. art. 245 provides: "The Armed Forces shall,
under the directions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against external
aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called
upon to do so." Its function thus is severely circumscribed.
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ical turmoil that they were intended to cure.20 If the purpose of the
necessity doctrine in a democratic society is to permit temporary
infringement of certain individual rights in order to preserve the
society as a whole, expanding it to justify abrogation of the constitu-
tion, suspension of elections, and elimination of the executive and
legislature transforms the doctrine into a cynical perversion.20 2
Not only did the court's ruling stretch the necessity doctrine
beyond its historically limited application, but in merely deciding to
consider the doctrine the court was operating under two incompati-
ble assumptions. The first assumption is that the 1973 Constitution
was the fundamental governing instrument of Pakistani society.
Since the doctrine of necessity excuses otherwise illegal conduct, it is
axiomatic that the violated laws remain valid. Otherwise, a judicial
inquiry into the necessity for the violation becomes gratuitous and
irrelevant.
The second assumption is that Zia's regime was entitled to
appear before the court to claim state necessity. Only legitimate
regimes, those that were properly installed as the government, are
privileged to advance the argument that their actions were justified
by such necessity. Therefore, in merely allowing Zia's regime this
privilege, the court implicitly determined that the regime was legiti-
mate. These assumptions are incompatible because the regime's
entire governmental structure was established in direct violation of
the constitution. By seizing power and holding the constitution in
abeyance, Zia was effectively replacing the constitution with his own
will. Judicial recognition of the regime as the country's government
involves the implicit acceptance of this transformation.
Hence, any invocation of the necessity doctrine becomes mean-
ingless. Since it had implicitly invalidated the 1973 Constitution, the
higher law which Zia had violated, the court obviated any recourse
to that doctrine. Only if the regime had violated its own laws, which
in fact it did not, would the doctrine have any relevance at all.
Nevertheless, if the necessity argument allows the court some
control over the regime, should it not invoke the doctrine despite
these internal inconsistencies? For several reasons the answer
remains no. The cost of interposing the necessity doctrine is far too
201. Since a fundamental principle of the necessity doctrine is that it will never justify
the usurpation of one branch of a government by another, it is all the more inappropriate
for the doctrine to permit the usurpation of both legislative and executive functions by an
outsider.
202. Separation of powers is an important aspect of Pakistani constitutional jurispru-
dence. As the court stated in Bhutto, "[t]he 1973 [Pakistan] Constitution provides for a
clear trichotomy of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the
State." 1977 PLD S. Ct. (Pak.) at 716.
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high a price, given the concomitant requirement of implicitly legiti-
mizing the installation of the new regime. By treating the regime as
the state for purposes of the defense, the court leaves the impression
that order has been restored, that the rule of law has prevailed, and
that the constitution retains vitality. In reality, the constitution has
been effectively destroyed, and no rule of law prevails. The appear-
ance of control over the regime only helps the government to consol-
idate its power.
There are also several practical limitations to a necessity analy-
sis of a coup d'etat. First, a court would be hard-pressed to exercise
independent and impartial review in the wake of such an upheaval,
particularly, as in this case, where the court is acting in direct contra-
vention of a military order. Although the Bhutto court stated that it
felt no constraints from the regime, one must question the sincerity
of this statement.20 3 Any judgment would thus be colored by the
implicit threat of harm to a decision adverse to the government.
Second, it is extremely doubtful whether any court has the capa-
bility to determine whether necessity is of such a grave nature as to
justify the substantial abrogation of the constitution through a coup.
While every inquiry into the necessity of an otherwise illegal govern-
mental act involves some speculation, the court's task in the Bhutto
case required substantially greater speculation than that needed in
the ordinary case. In the classic necessity case, a court must weigh
the harm caused by emergency measures against the harm of inac-
tion in the face of an emergency. This is a difficult task. The Bhutto
court, however, had to evaluate first, the condition of Pakistan had
the lawfully constituted organs of government continued to exist,
and second, the tangible and intangible consequences upon the
country of replacing the legislative and executive branches with a
military regime, while suspending fundamental rights. Such an
203. The court alluded to the aftermath of the Lakanmi decision, see supra notes 76-83
and accompanying text, when the military regime nullified the Nigerian Supreme Court's
decision. The court then explicitly distinguished the Nigerian experience from anything
it might expect if it ruled against the government.
[T]he Supreme Court of Pakistan, as at present constituted, does not feel itself
under any inhibition or restraint in taking a view in this case which appears to be
dictated by the highest considerations of law, justice, equity and good con-
science, and I also see no reason why the Martial Law Administration should not
accept the decision of this Court in the same spirit. I, therefore, venture to say
that reference to the aftermath of the judgment of the Nigerian Supreme Court is
completely misconceived and irrelevant to the legal questions we are considering
here.
PLD 1977 S. Ct. (Pak.) at 712. One wonders whether, in its insistence that such cynical
considerations do not affect it, the court is not, in Shakespeare's terms, protesting too
much.
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inquiry is beyond the competence of any court.2°4
The court is also impermissibly expanding its traditionally lim-
ited authority by partaking in such an inquiry. By considering the
propriety of eliminating other branches of government during an
emergency, the court is violating the most rudimentary notions of
separation of powers. When the court presumes to question the abil-
ity of the lawfully established legislature or executive to function
effectively, it is usurping power. The court's function is to review the
actions of the legislature and executive, not their efficacy. As the
constitutionally empowered arbiter of the law, the court must remain
steadfast in refusing to permit destruction of the fundamental power
relations in society.
Finally, by permitting the regime to advance the necessity
defense to justify usurpation of constitutional organs of government,
the court is constructing a principled basis for its own demise.
According to the court's own reasoning, the doctrine justifies the for-
cible elimination of any constitutionally established institutions that
hamper the restoration of order. Presumably, this includes the court.
The court never actually considered this possibility, since Zia's
regime never attempted to remove the judiciary, preferring instead
to limit its jurisdiction. However, by reclaiming its jurisdiction on
grounds that the facts did not warrant such curtailment, the court
implied that some circumstances might warrant curtailment, or more
extreme measures.
This theoretical possibility raises some troubling prospects.
First, such a possibility is entirely inconsistent with the function of
the necessity doctrine which provides courts with a means to assess
the legality of otherwise unlawful state conduct.20 5 This can only be
accomplished, it seems, if a functioning court exists. Second, any
legal theory which permits such drastic measures consistent with the
constitution would be a deadly tool in the hands of any future court
sympathetic to military rule. It would allow such a court to validate
effortlessly any of the regime's attempts to curtail judicial authority.
Third, Zia's regime could itself effectively use this expansive doc-
trine to nullify any of the court's bothersome decisions or oust it
204. Moreover, the court's reliance upon the necessity defense mandates that it main-
tain continued scrutiny of the regime to determine whether particular governmental poli-
ies are, in fact, necessary in view of the circumstances. Given the myriad of activities
any government undertakes, such scrutiny would be impracticable, if not impossible.
While continued oversight imposes an awesome responsibility, selective oversight, which
is what the court actually wanted, could provide the court with what it perceived as an
invaluable opportunity to impose limits upon patently unacceptable conduct of the
regime.
205. The court could possibly be put in the curious and awkward position of approv-
ing its own demise on grounds that its judgment can no longer be trusted.
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entirely. While the regime could conceivably eliminate the court's
power or existence without this theoretical basis, the necessity doc-
trine could surround such actions with an aura of legitimacy.20 6
V
CONCLUSION
The use of the necessity doctrine to legitimize a coup d'etat or
other revolutionary alteration of the government is inappropriate.
This application of the doctrine is incorrect for two reasons. First,
the assumption that the court will be able to influence the regime by
using the doctrine in this manner is not realistic. Second, the court's
action validates the new regime and gives it the appearance of
legitimacy.
The necessity defense simply cannot exist in a military dictator-
ship. The defense presumes an independent judiciary and an execu-
tive or legislature that is willing to abide by the court's decisions.
Without such a political and legal environment, a resort to the
206. During the past few years, following the coup and the Bhutto decision, the polit-
ical climate in Pakistan has worsened considerably. In January 1979 a Freedom House
survey reported that in contrast to the general international trend, political rights and
civil liberties had declined in Pakistan. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1979, at A6, col. 3. Amnesty
International charged that torture, imprisonment and human rights violations increased
steadily in 1981. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1982, at A5, col. 1. This accusation was echoed in
a Reagan administration report on human rights charging Pakistan with torture of its
citizens. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1982, at A10, col. 5. All political activity is banned, id, and
the arrest and detention of the regime's critics continues. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1982, at
AS, col. 4.
In conjunction with the increased oppression of his political opponents, Zia has
mounted a full-scale assault on the nation's judiciary. On March 24, 1981, he promol-
gated Provincial Constitutional Order No. I which, inter alia, validated all actions of the
regime since the coup, prohibited any court from reviewing the legality of martial law
orders or regulations, granted Zia the power to amend the constitution at will, and
required each high court judge to take a new oath of office. Provisional Constitution
Order 1981 (C.M.L.A. Order No. 1 of 1981) Art. 15, 16 & 17 in 12 CONsTITUTIoNS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustern & G. Flanz, ed. 1972). On March 25,
1981, Zia dismissed nine senior judges for their refusal to take the new oath of office. Of
the nine, three were supreme court justices and included Chief Justice Anwar ul-Haq, the
author of the Bhutto opinion. The remaining six included two judges each from the
Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan high courts. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1981, at A12, col. 3.
The remaining members of the court apparently agreed to these terms.
Most recently, on August 12, 1983, Zia promised that he would hold elections for the
National Assembly and end martial law within 18 months. These planned elections will
be conducted on a non-party basis, and candidates will not be permitted to conduct indi-
vidual campaigns. The Washington Post, August 13, 1983, at A15, col. 1. This is the
sixth time since seizing office that he has announced elections. N.Y. Times, August 18,
1983, at A26, col. I (editorial).
Human rights violations are still rampant. During September 1983, 700 protesters
were arrested, 69 of them sentenced to be flogged, and two dozen killed. The State
Department noted in a recent report that 11 persons died in custody during 1982 from
abusive forms of interrogation. L.A. Times, September 30, 1983, § II, at 7, col. 5.
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defense is a sham. If the regime would be unwilling to abide by a
court's adverse ruling, any decision on behalf of the state is suspect.
The use of the necessity defense to justify a military regime not
only gives legal substance to a tragic political reality, but it also cre-
ates a false impression that the proper incidents of the defense are
present. The creation of such an impression is invaluable to a
regime which has just violently overthrown the lawful, constitution-
ally mandated government.
In essence, the courts have removed from the regimes the
responsibility for holding themselves accountable to the country for
their drastic actions. The regimes do not need to explain why they
took extra-constitutional steps; they can rely upon an opinion by a
supposedly impartial tribunal.
The Pakistan Supreme Court did not act in the national interest
in its use of the necessity doctrine in the Bhutto case. The court
upheld, as constitutional, actions by the regime which undermined
the raison d'etre of the Pakistani Constitution. The court's action
legitimized the removal of a popularly elected government and the
disenfranchisement of the population.
Had the court held that the conduct at issue was clearly an
unjustifiable departure from the constitution, both country and judi-
ciary would have benefited. At the very least, they would have been
no worse off. While the court might have been removed after such a
ruling, Zia would have had to assuage a country committed to demo-
cratic rule without the assistance of the court. Without the court and
constitution behind him, Zia may have been compelled to make con-
cessions to bolster his then fledgling regime. Instead, the regime
became entrenched to the point where the judicial system is now
firmly under Zia's control.
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